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YOU CAN'T ALWAYS USE THE ZIPPO CODE:
THE FALLACY OF A UNIFORM THEORY OF
INTERNET PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Dennis T. Yokoyama*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, International Shoe v. Washington' celebrated its fiftieth an-
niversary. This seminal case brought the personal jurisdiction doc-
trine into the twentieth century by extricating the doctrine from the
rigid formalism of Pennoyer v. Neff.2 While many commentators re-
flected upon the significance of what International Shoe had wrought,3
the computer world continued its rapid evolution. Computers became
increasingly powerful and at the same time cheaper to buy, operating
systems based on graphical interfaces were making computers easier
to use, and rapid developments in software, especially browsers, made
it easy for people to explore, inhabit, and profit from a new frontier of
information and commercial possibilities-the Internet. 4 Increasing
numbers of people, at work and at home, logged onto the Internet,
* Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Legal Research and Writing Program, South-
western University School of Law. I am grateful for the research stipend provided by the Board
of Trustees of Southwestern University School of Law. I am also grateful for the advice and
moral support of Southwestern's Dean, Leigh H. Taylor. I thank my Southwestern colleagues-
Christopher Cameron, Michael Dorff, Danielle Hart, and Austen Parrish-for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts. I am also thankful for the help of my research assistants, Lina
Melidonian and Jason Rosen. Thanks also to the editors of the DePaul Law Review for their
fine help. Finally, I express my gratitude to Janis K. Yokoyama and Denise K. Yokoyama for all
that they do for me. I dedicate this Article to the memory of my parents, Herbert S. and Yayeko
Mae Yokoyama.
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. The University of California Davis Law Review put together a symposium issue (Spring
1995 issue)-Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction-to
commemorate the anniversary.
4. See Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First
Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 411 (1998) (noting that the convergence between increasingly
sophisticated technology and inexpensive computers and software spurred the growth of the
Internet). In 1996, one court, in reflecting upon the Internet's "extraordinary growth," observed
that "[i]n 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the Internet, and by 1989, the number
stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over 1,000,000 computers were linked. Today,
over 9,400,000 host computers, of which approximately 60 percent are located within the United
States, are estimated to be linked to the Internet." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D.
Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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using a variety of Internet features, such as downloading computer
files, communicating via e-mail, and visiting websites on the World
Wide Web. 5 The Internet had not only arrived, it had taken root, un-
leashing permanent changes in information dissemination, communi-
cation, and commerce. Probably only a prescient few in 1995 foresaw
that personal jurisdiction and the Internet would quickly converge,
springing forth new issues that would challenge the applicability of the
existing personal jurisdiction model embodied by International Shoe
and its progeny.6 Disputes involving Internet activities were arising in
1995 and litigation commencing soon thereafter would open the flood-
gate to issues involving Internet personal jurisdiction.7 The prolifera-
tion of cases involving Internet jurisdiction issues and their resolution
quickly amassed into a sprawling, untidy, and inconsistent body of In-
ternet jurisdiction law.
Now, ten years later, this Article examines the current state of In-
ternet jurisdiction jurisprudence by examining the seminal decisions
that marked this frontier of personal jurisdiction and that spawned a
plethora of conflicting judicial decisions and commentary. The early
cases dealing with Internet jurisdiction required courts to make sense
of and to characterize the Internet activities at issue, to decide
whether the traditional model of personal jurisdiction could accom-
modate the issues arising from activities in the seemingly borderless
world of the Internet, and to pluck from their imaginations a way of
dealing with Internet jurisdiction that would comport with the long-
standing demands of due process.
A significant early line of cases examined the effect of the defen-
dant's operation of a website on the personal jurisdiction issue. These
courts broadly held that jurisdiction could be exercised in every state
in which the website could be accessed, in effect, creating universal
5. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. About forty million people worldwide were Internet users in 1996.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
6. See, e.g., William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to
the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995); Michael J. Santisi, Note, Pres-Kap,
Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending the Reach of the Long-Arm Statute Through
the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 433 (1995).
7. Indeed, 1996 marked the leading edge of the wave of cases involving Internet jurisdiction.
See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); Edias Software Int'l L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996);
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
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jurisdiction.8 The most influential test pertaining to Internet jurisdic-
tion was set forth in a trademark infringement case, Zippo Manufac-
turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.9 The Zippo decision eschewed the
overly simplistic approach of finding jurisdiction wherever the defen-
dant's website could be accessed. 10 Instead, the court created a sliding
scale of purposeful availment based on the interactivity of the defen-
dant's Internet activities." The Zippo decision, which remains the
most influential case in this area of law to date, provided a much-
needed change of course in the evolution of Internet jurisdiction. 12
In Zippo's wake, many courts, in their zealous and understandable
quest to adopt a single standard for all Internet jurisdiction issues,
have improvidently chosen to apply a unitary test based on Zippo to
all Internet jurisdiction issues.13 These courts have mistakenly found
the Zippo test is applicable simply because the defendant's conduct
involved Internet activities. These courts, in applying the Zippo test,
have failed to consider fully the factual and legal underpinnings of the
lawsuit in their analysis of personal jurisdiction, a consideration essen-
tial to proper application of the traditional model of personal
jurisdiction.
This Article maintains that principles governing Internet jurisdic-
tion issues should be grounded in, rather than divorced from, the
traditional model of personal jurisdiction. The exercise of personal
jurisdiction arising from Internet activities should conform to first
principles of jurisdiction. The jurisdictional analysis requires evaluat-
ing the defendant's contacts with the forum state in order to assess
whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. In
addition, the analysis requires determining whether the assertion of
jurisdiction is reasonable. Even though any exercise of jurisdiction
must conform with these first principles of jurisdiction, determining
whether particular Internet activities constitute minimum contacts re-
8. See, e.g., Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
9. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
10. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
11. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
12. For a fuller discussion of Zippo, see infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.B. Many commentators also have urged the adoption of a single stan-
dard for Internet jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amanda Reid, Operationalizing the Law of Jurisdiction:
Where in the World Can I Be Sued for Operating a World Wide Web Page?, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y
227, 261 (2003) (stating that "[h]aving more than one way to operationalize purposeful availment
based on Web contacts does not make sense"); see also Richard A. Bales & Suzanne Van Wert,
Internet Website Jurisdiction, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & IFO. L. 21, 22-23 (2001) (propos-
ing a "single framework" for assessing Internet activities).
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quires sensitivity to the fact that some Internet activities may have no
meaningful analogues to traditional forms of communication, and that
these activities therefore must be assessed differently. 14
This Article is organized as follows: Part II describes the traditional
model of personal jurisdiction, summarizing the Supreme Court's ar-
ticulation of the principles that govern general and specific jurisdic-
tion. Part III enters the world of the Internet and Internet
jurisdiction, first by sketching the development of the Internet and
then by discussing the seminal cases and positions taken regarding In-
ternet jurisdiction that continue to frame the debate today. Part III
focuses on the Zippo case by examining its rationale and its enormous
significance. As Part III discusses, the Zippo decision's rationale and
influence in many ways parallels that of the International Shoe
decision.
Part IV asserts that the search for a uniform test encompassing the
whole of Internet jurisdiction issues is ultimately a misguided exercise,
and one that has caused much of the disarray in Internet jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Because the Internet hosts a multitudinous array of
activities and communities that now mirrors all aspects of society, 15
the resolution of Internet jurisdiction issues must be sensitive to the
defendant's specific Internet activities. Equally important in the con-
text of specific jurisdiction is evaluating the defendant's conduct, both
Internet-related and otherwise, in light of the plaintiff's specific claims
asserted against the defendant. While this is axiomatic in resolving
specific jurisdiction issues, it is surprising how frequently this principle
is cast aside when the issue concerns Internet activities. What ulti-
mately undermines any uniform theory of Internet jurisdiction is the
fact that such theories focus far too much on the defendant's Internet
activities to the exclusion of how those activities relate to the substan-
tive aspects of the plaintiff's claim.
Part IV offers a framework for evaluating Internet jurisdiction is-
sues that, while grounded in the traditional model of personal jurisdic-
tion, takes into account the array of activities facilitated by, and
occurring through, the Internet. Part IV also recommends a model of
Internet jurisdiction that uses as examples the following key areas of
substantive law where Internet activities have intersected: infringe-
14. Websites and e-mails, for example, are both analogous to, as well as distinguishable from,
more traditional forms of communication.
15. In 1997, Professor Dan Burk predicted that "[a]s the community of Internet users grows
increasingly diverse, and the range of on-line interaction expands, disputes of every kind may be
expected to occur. On-line contracts will be breached, on-line torts will be committed, on-line
crimes will be perpetrated." Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 3, 3 (1997).
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ment actions, contract actions, and general jurisdiction. The model's
virtue is that it is anchored in first principles of personal jurisdiction
while accommodating the nature of the Internet activities at issue.
The model explicitly recognizes that resolving personal jurisdiction is-
sues requires the assessment of the defendant's Internet contacts with
the forum state in light of the factual and substantive legal underpin-
nings of the lawsuit.
II. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe v. Washington
16
ushered in the modern era of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The
decision freed this jurisprudence from the moorings of the wooden
doctrine announced in Pennoyer v. Neff,17 which considered presence
in the forum state to be the sine qua non standard for personal juris-
diction.18 As applied to corporations whose very existence is a fiction,
the concept of presence, as well as other legal fictions, such as implied
consent and doing business in the forum, proved difficult to apply to
corporate activities in the forum state. 19 In declaring a new rule for
personal jurisdiction, the Court in International Shoe stated,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."20
Based on International Shoe and its progeny, personal jurisdiction
analysis proceeds down a familiar doctrinal path. In the absence of a
traditional basis of jurisdiction, such as waiver 2l or consent,2 2 citizen-
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
18. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (stating that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory"). In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 251 (1958), the Court contrasted the Pennoyer rule, which it termed "rigid," with the Inter-
national Shoe rule, which it characterized as a "flexible standard."
19. Twelve years after its decision in International Shoe, the Court noted that the Pennoyer
doctrine proved particularly difficult to apply to nonresident corporations and ultimately led to
the new approach taken in International Shoe. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222
(1957); see also Christopher D. Cameron & David R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 769,
779 (1995) (noting that the Supreme Court in International Shoe "reached out to repair a doc-
trine in serious disarray").
20. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
21. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (stating that the "personal
jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right").
22. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (finding enforceable a forum
selection clause in a cruise ship passenger contract); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964) (upholding a consent to jurisdiction clause in contract).
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ship 23 or incorporation in the forum state, or service of process upon
an individual in the forum state,24 a court will examine whether the
forum state's long-arm statute extends to the nonresident defendant in
light of the plaintiff's particular claims and the defendant's activities in
the forum.25 If the statute applies, the court determines whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the constitutional
guarantee of due process. The due process analysis, in turn, requires
examining whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the fo-
rum state and whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
reasonable. 26
The contacts analysis will vary depending on which type of personal
jurisdiction is at issue, general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.27
The applicability of either type depends on the relationship between
the defendant's contacts with the forum state and the plaintiff's claims
raised against the defendant. The exercise of general jurisdiction ex-
ists independently from the factual and legal underpinnings of the
plaintiff's claims and depends solely on the defendant's contacts with
the forum state.28 In contrast, the exercise of specific jurisdiction re-
quires a sufficiently close nexus between the defendant's contacts with
the forum state and the plaintiff's claims. 29 For the exercise of either
general or specific jurisdiction, the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum state must show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of
the forum state's benefits and protections. 30
Finally, even if the defendant has had minimum contacts with the
forum state, the assertion of jurisdiction must comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 31 In other words, if
23. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940).
24. The notion of transient jurisdiction was considered constitutional in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 (1877). In a post-International Shoe decision involving transient jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld personal jurisdiction over the defendant who was person-
ally served in the forum. The Court, however, was evenly split as to whether the Pennoyer view
of transient jurisdiction should be dispositive or whether the minimum contacts test should be
applied. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
25. For a fuller description of these traditional bases, see Sheehan, supra note 4, at 388-90.
26. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 123 (3d ed. 1999).
27. These terms originated in Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-49 (1966).
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
30. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316). The notion of purposeful availment arose in Hanson, in which the Court stated that
the defendant's contacts with the forum state must include "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
31. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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the purposeful availment requirement has been satisfied, the inquiry
then turns to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitu-
tionally reasonable. 32 This aspect is satisfied when requiring the de-
fendant to litigate in the forum state is a reasonable exercise of the
forum state's power. The Court indicated that the inquiry into reason-
ableness requires an analysis of the following factors: (1) The burden
on the defendant in litigating in the forum state; (2) "the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute"; (3) "the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief"; (4) "the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies"; and (5) "the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. ' 33 This framework
of personal jurisdiction forms the foundation from which all assertions
of personal jurisdiction must be based, and which ought to include the
exercise of jurisdiction over defendants whose contacts with the forum
state arise from the Internet.
III. THE INTERNET JURISDICTION AGE
The Internet is a gigantic storehouse of information and immense
commercial possibilities.34 Yet, the Internet is also an amorphous and
intangible realm unencumbered by borders, a universe that reaches
everywhere and is accessible at any time.35 Nevertheless, the hard
wire underpinnings of the Internet, of course, are very much of the
physical world.
A. A Brief Description of the Internet
The Internet, put simply, is a decentralized, networked series of
computers through which people can communicate with one an-
32. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (hold-
ing that, even if the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state (an issue that created
a 4-4-1 split on the Court), it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant).
33. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The significance of the reasonableness prong is
evidenced in the Court's decision in Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-15, a case in which the Court was
evenly divided on the minimum contacts prong but unanimous in finding that the exercise of
jurisdiction was unreasonable.
34. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (stating that "[t]he Web is ... comparable.., to
both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawl-
ing mall offering goods and services").
35. The Supreme Court noted that the various means of communication available through the
Internet collectively "constitute a unique medium-known to its users as 'cyberspace'-located
in no particular geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access
to the Internet." Id. at 851.
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other.36 In 1969, the precursor of today's Internet was launched: The
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), a
networked series of computers. 37 The sole purpose of this research
and development was for military uses.38 ARPANET was used prima-
rily by scientists and other researchers to exchange military and na-
tional security data.39 Only a limited segment of researchers,
scientists, government employees, and government contractors had
access to and used ARPANET when it was launched. 40 The Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, an agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense, created ARPANET as a communications system involving
networked computers that would survive and function even if a nu-
clear attack were to destroy some of the networked computers. 41 The
Internet's durability is based on the decentralized nature of numerous
networked computers, which means that information can be transmit-
ted and routed through innumerable channels. 42
Out of ARPANET emerged today's Internet,43 which facilitates the
exchange of information in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most out-
standing feature of the Internet has been the creation and develop-
ment of the now-familiar World Wide Web, which provides a
significant way to send and retrieve information through the Internet.
The World Wide Web consists of documents known as webpages,
which are stored on and delivered through computer servers.44 A
webpage is a document with a unique Internet online address-a Uni-
form Resource Locator, or "URL."45 A webpage may be composed
of any combination of text, images, and sounds, along with hypertext
links that connect webpages.
The World Wide Web owes its existence to the development of
these hypertext links, or more precisely, to the creation of the pro-
36. JOSEPH MIGGA KIZzA, CIVILIZING THE INTERNET: GLOBAL CONCERNS AND EFFORTS To-
WARD REGULATION 3 (1998).
37. PAUL GILSTER, THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO NETWORK EXPLO-
RATION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL USER 14 (1994).
38. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE AND CATALOG 11 (1992).
39. KIERSTEN CONNER-SAX & ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: THE NEXT GENERATION 4
(1999).
40. Id. at 5.
41. GILSTER, supra note 37, at 16.
42. Information sent through the Internet is broken down into "packets." Id. at 15. Each
packet has a "header" specifying the destination of the packet. Id. As packets travel through
the Internet to their intended destination, they go from networked computer to networked com-
puter, and "computers routing this data can select alternate routes when a given link fails." Id.
at 18.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 39, at 107.
45. Id. at 108.
1154 [Vol. 54:1147
INTERNET PERSONAL JURISDICTION
gramming language Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). 46 HTML
was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 47 A document writ-
ten in HTML can be read and displayed on any computer that has a
browser, which is software that can interpret and display HTML docu-
ments coming from Web servers. 48 Documents written in HTML are
embedded with programming code so that a person can click on a
hyperlink to go from one webpage to another.49 As a result, the In-
ternet has become something of a seamless web tying together infor-
mation stored on the vast network of servers that make up the
Internet.
A person or entity seeking to establish a website has to obtain a
website address.50 Obtaining a website address requires the registra-
tion of a domain name (such as "ibm.com"), which would be assigned
a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address.51 Registration is accom-
plished through a company operating as a domain name registrar.
52
In processing the domain name registration application, the registrar
verifies that the domain name being sought has not already been
registered. 53
Having obtained a domain name, people can create a website or
have one created for them. In addition, people will need the website
hosted so that the site is accessible to Internet users. 54 To help fill this
need, website hosting companies have sprouted.55 Website hosting
companies store websites on their server computers so that the web-
site operator can have it continuously available and need not worry
about maintaining its own server. 56 Creating and having a website
hosted has become much easier and more inexpensive, and has thus
led to the proliferation of websites.
Because a website typically can be accessed by anyone with Internet
access, a website has a ubiquitous electronic presence, viewable any-
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2002).
51. EFRAM TURBAN ET AL., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2004: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE
611 (2004). An Internet Protocol (IP) address is a unique numerical host address of the regis-
tered domain name and can be likened to a telephone number. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra
note 39, at 17-18.
52. TURBAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 611.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 609-10 (describing the array of available website hosting options).
55. See id. (describing the comparative advantages and disadvantages of various website host-
ing options).
56. Id. at 610.
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where and at any time. As the information available on the Internet
has proliferated due to the ever-increasing number of website opera-
tors putting out an increasing amount of content, the World Wide
Web has become a juggernaut of information. Unlike television and
radio and magazines and newspapers, the Internet is not bound by a
finite number of broadcasting channels or newsstand space and circu-
lation. It is hardly surprising, then, that judges initially faced with per-
sonal jurisdiction issues intertwined with Internet activities were awed
with the universal accessibility of information available on the
Internet.
B. The Zippo Decision and the Sliding Scale of Interactivity
Operating a website accessible in a particular state most certainly
constitutes a contact with that state. The question courts and com-
mentators have grappled with is how to evaluate that contact for pur-
poses of personal jurisdiction. By far, the most influential case
involving Internet jurisdiction is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
Dot Corn, Inc.57 In appreciating the rationale and significance of the
Zippo decision, it is important to understand the law of Internet juris-
diction at the time of the decision.
A significant precursor to Zippo is Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc.,58 which held that a website advertising the defendant's goods
or services sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant wherever the website could be viewed. In Inset, Inset Systems, a
Connecticut corporation, alleged that Instruction Set, a Massachusetts
corporation, had infringed on Inset's federally protected trademark
when Instruction Set registered the domain name "Inset.com. '59 Inset
filed its suit in a Connecticut federal district court, and Instruction Set
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.60 Instruction Set
had no offices or employees in Connecticut.61 Its one contact with
Connecticut was that its website was accessible in Connecticut. In de-
nying Instruction Set's motion, the court distinguished website adver-
tising from advertising through traditional media.62 The court
reasoned that because website advertising is available any time to any-
one with Internet access, businesses engaged in website advertising
have manifested purposeful availment in virtually all fora in which In-
57. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
58. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
59. Id. at 163.
60. Id. at 162.
61. Id. at 162-63.
62. Id. at 165.
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ternet access is available.63 The court construed website advertising as
marketing to the entire nation, and thus, with the potential of reaping
sales nationwide, the website operator must assume the risks and bur-
dens of being sued outside its home state. 64 The rationale of Inset-
that because a website can be viewed continuously in the forum, the
website constitutes purposeful availment-quickly drew approval
from other courts facing similar issues.
65
Thus, by the time Zippo came along, a growing body of case law
had started taking root. This emerging body of law equated the oper-
ation of a website to purposeful availment anywhere the website could
be accessed, which meant just about everywhere. An enduring hall-
mark of Zippo will be its incisive questioning and well-reasoned un-
dermining of the Inset rationale and its thoughtfulness in creating an
alternative approach to Internet jurisdiction. Zippo, like the Inset
case, involved a trademark dispute in which the defendant's contacts
with the forum state consisted almost exclusively of its Internet activi-
ties.66 In Zippo, Judge Sean J. McLaughlin, a federal district judge
sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania, announced that a bet-
ter way to resolve the question of specific jurisdiction is to examine
the nature and quality of the defendant's Internet activities on a slid-
ing scale of purposeful availment.67 Judge McLaughlin stated that
"the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exer-
cised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.
68
In Zippo, Zippo Manufacturing Corporation, the Pennsylvania-
based maker of the world-famous Zippo tobacco lighters, sued Zippo
Dot Com, Inc., alleging various claims based on federal and state
trademark law.69 Zippo Dot Com, a California-based corporation,
was operating a website through which it advertised its Internet news
service.70 Zippo Dot Corn's website gave subscribers to its service ac-
cess to various Internet newsgroups.71 Zippo Dot Corn offered three
levels of subscription, ranging from a free subscription to two types of
63. Id. (reasoning that "once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising,
the advertising is available continuously to any Internet user. [The defendant] has therefore
purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Connecticut.").
64. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
65. See, e.g., Teleco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404,
406 (E.D. Va. 1997); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996).
66. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
67. Id. at 1124.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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paid subscriptions. 72 To become a paid subscriber, a person had to
submit his or her name and address on an online form and pay for the
subscription with a credit card by way of telephone or directly through
Zippo Dot Com's website, which was designed to complete the trans-
action. 73 Zippo Dot Corn then sent the subscriber a password al-
lowing access to Internet newsgroup messages archived on Zippo Dot
Com's server in California. 74 In its lawsuit, Zippo Manufacturing ob-
jected to Zippo Dot Com's registration of the domain names "zippo.
com," "zippo.net," and "zipponews.com. '75 Zippo Manufacturing
also objected to Zippo Dot Corn's use of "Zippo" throughout its web-
site and in the headings of newsgroup messages that subscribers
downloaded. 76
Zippo Dot Com's contacts with Pennsylvania existed almost en-
tirely through the Internet.77 Zippo Dot Com advertised its news ser-
vice solely through its website.78 People paid for their subscriptions
through either the telephone or Zippo Dot Com's website. 79 At the
time of the lawsuit, Zippo Dot Com had about 140,000 subscribers,
about 3,000 of whom were Pennsylvanians. 80 In addition, Zippo Dot
Corn had contracted with several Internet service providers in Penn-
sylvania to allow their subscribers access to Zippo Dot Com's news
services. 81
In fashioning a novel personal jurisdiction framework for evaluating
Internet activities, the court characterized Internet activities as run-
ning along a sliding scale of purposeful availment. The court stated
that the purposeful availment pole is anchored whenever "a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the In-
ternet, personal jurisdiction is proper. 82 At the opposite end of the
spectrum are passive websites "where a defendant has simply posted
information . . . which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. '83
In the middle of the spectrum are "interactive Websites where a user
72. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1121.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1121-22.
77. Id. at 1121.
78. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)).
83. Id. (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of inter-
activity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Website." 84
In applying the sliding scale test to the facts before it, the court
rejected Zippo Dot Com's argument that its contacts in Pennsylvania
and the business it generated in Pennsylvania were "fortuitous.
85
The court concluded that Zippo Dot Com's activities in Pennsylvania
reflected a well-reasoned decision to do business in Pennsylvania.
86
The court found that Zippo Dot Com's contacts with the forum state,
which included contracts with several Pennsylvania Internet service
providers and three thousand Pennsylvanians who subscribed to
Zippo Dot Com's service, established that Zippo Dot Com had forged
a substantial connection with Pennsylvania, 87 and that the lawsuit for
trademark infringement arose out of the defendant's activities in
Pennsylvania. 88 Furthermore, the court noted that if Zippo Dot Com
had wanted to avoid being subject to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts, it easily could have done so by declining to sell "its services to
Pennsylvania residents. '89
Finally, addressing the second level of the due process analysis, the
court held that jurisdiction over Zippo Dot Coin was reasonable. 90
Emphasizing that Zippo Manufacturing was a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, the court noted that Pennsylvania has a "strong interest in adju-
dicating disputes involving the alleged infringement of trademarks
84. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121 (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.
Mo. 1996)). While diplomatically asserting that Inset "represents the outer limits of the exercise
of personal jurisdiction based on the Internet," id. at 1125, the court, in applying its sliding scale
test, would most certainly have found the defendant's website in Inset to be passive.
85. Id. at 1126.
86. Id. at 1126-27.
87. Id. at 1127.
88. The court remarked that under Third Circuit law, a trademark infringement claim arose
"'where the passing off occurs."' Id. at 1127 (quoting Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Mar-
tino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1976)). Thus, if the defendant has sold substantial quantities of the
infringing products in the forum, the infringement action has arisen in the forum state. Zippo,
952 F. Supp. at 1127.
89. Id. In one respect, Zippo illustrates the ease by which companies can engage in business
via the Internet. It is just as easy on the Internet, and, of course, potentially much more profita-
ble, to do business with residents in several states as it is do business with residents of one state.
Economies of scale are much easier to achieve with Internet-based businesses than with tradi-
tional bricks-and-mortar types of businesses. So, to some extent, it is understandable why many
companies would choose to do business with anyone and everyone, regardless of where that
customer resided, especially when services or goods can be provided through the Internet (as in
Zippo Dot Coin's Internet news service).
90. Id.
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owned by resident corporations," and that the court must "give due
regard to the Plaintiff's choice to seek relief in Pennsylvania." 91
C. Zippo's Legacy-A Necessary Change in Course
for Internet Jurisdiction
Zippo rejected the notion of universal jurisdiction emanating from
the Inset line of cases92 and Zippo's rationale better demarcated the
intersection between Internet business practices and purposeful avail-
ment. Compared with Inset, the Zippo decision is much more consis-
tent with the existing model of personal jurisdiction.
The premise in Inset that website advertising alone establishes per-
sonal jurisdiction contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court's view of pur-
poseful availment in rulings such as World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson.93 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, while living in
New York, purchased a new Audi from a New York car dealer. 94 The
plaintiffs, having decided to move to Arizona, set out in their Audi to
their new home.95 While driving through Oklahoma, their car was
rear-ended and became engulfed in flames. 96 Bringing a products lia-
bility suit in Oklahoma, the plaintiffs sued the car manufacturer
(Audi), the national distributor (Volkswagen of America), the re-
gional distributor of the car based in the New York tri-state area
(World-Wide Volkswagen), and the car dealer (Seaway Volk-
swagen). 97 World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway Volkswagen moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.98
The Court ruled that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
regional distributor and the car dealer violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 The Court reasoned that
while it was foreseeable that the plaintiffs would operate the car
outside of New York, that type of foreseeability does not satisfy due
process. 100 The Court noted that, even though the point of having a
91. Id.
92. "As many courts now recognize, the problem with the approach in Inset Systems is that it
would allow anyone with a website to be sued anywhere in the world, even in jurisdictions to
which the website was not expressly aimed, because access to a website is not limited geographi-
cally." Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159 (W.D. Wis.
2004) (citations omitted).
93. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
94. Id. at 288.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 299.
100. Id. at 295.
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car is to transport people, often across great distances, the unilateral
activity of a consumer in transporting a car across state lines would
not exhibit purposeful availment of local distributors and retailers. 1 1
Rather, the foreseeability critical to due process, according to the
Court, is whether "the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there. °10 2 The Court found that a contrary holding would
undermine a business's settled expectations borne ordinarily through
careful planning of where potential litigation may take place.
10 3
The World-Wide Volkswagen decision is relevant to personal juris-
diction issues involving website advertising. In assessing purposeful
availment when the defendant operates a website, the crucial question
of foreseeability is not whether it is foreseeable that a person can ac-
cess the defendant's website in the forum state, but whether the de-
fendant could reasonably foresee being haled into the forum state to
defend itself in a lawsuit. The Inset rationale undermines settled doc-
trine because it neglects to address a significant aspect of personal
jurisdiction: The principle that a defendant must purposefully direct
its activities at, take deliberate action in, or create a substantial con-
nection with the forum state so as to provide fair warning that its ac-
tivities will most likely subject the defendant to jurisdiction in that
forum.1 0 4 A website exists electronically and its accessibility is uncon-
strained by state or even international borders. Thus, a website po-
tentially exists everywhere. The Inset line of cases essentially
mandates universal jurisdiction by having courts exercise personal ju-
risdiction wherever a website is accessible. 10 5
The Inset theory of jurisdiction, however, mistakenly conflates web-
site advertising with the products or services that are marketed. Web-
101. Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Id.
104. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (stating
that "[t]he 'substantial connection' between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a
finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State" (citations omitted)); see also Millennium Enters. v. Millennium
Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999) (stating that a website accessible to forum
residents, by itself, fails to demonstrate direct action taken towards the forum).
105. After the Zippo decision, a slew of decisions attacked the Inset decision as endorsing
universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 2d
1154 (W.D. Wis. 2004); Digital Control, Inc. v. Boretronics, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186
(W.D. Wash. 2001); Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 714, 719-20 (E.D. Va. 2000);
Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group LLC, 84 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908-10 (S.D. Ohio 1999);
Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (E.D. Va. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs
Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Millennium Enters., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922; E-Data
Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D. Conn. 1997).
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site advertising should not be confused with what is being advertised,
and the mere fact that the advertising may be viewed in a particular
forum should not suffice to establish purposeful availment. Under
World-Wide Volkswagen, a company that distributes or sells products
in a particular state has most likely purposefully availed itself of that
state.10 6 The purposeful availment requirement is satisfied if the de-
fendant "regularly" sells its products to "customers or residents" of
the forum state or if the defendant "indirectly, through others, serves
or seeks to serve the [forum state's] market. ' 10 7 However, a com-
pany's advertisements on a website alone cannot constitute purposeful
availment. Although it is undoubtedly foreseeable that a website is
accessible virtually anywhere, it is a mistake to conclude that a web-
site operator has availed itself of the benefits and privileges in every
jurisdiction. In the same way that it is foreseeable that a motorist will
use a car to travel across state lines, it is foreseeable that people be-
yond the website operator's home state and states in which it does
business may access the operator's website. The Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen said that this type of foreseeability must give way to a
determination as to whether the defendant had directed any activities
towards the forum state. 108 The Court emphasized that the defendant
must be able to plan and direct its conduct in such a way that it can
reasonably foresee in what fora it will be subject to suit.10 9 Website
advertising generally will be a much more attenuated contact with a
given state than the car sold by a New York car dealer and driven by a
family into Oklahoma, a contact that the Court found insufficient for
due process purposes.110
In significant ways, the Zippo decision parallels the International
Shoe decision. Both cases confronted head-on a commercial environ-
ment that tested the limits of existing jurisdictional doctrine, that ex-
posed the doctrine's flaws and inherent limitations, and that,
therefore, demanded a new way of evaluating jurisdictional issues.
The Court in International Shoe fashioned a new approach to personal
jurisdiction in a world increasingly dominated by large companies en-
gaging in interstate commerce. The court in Zippo took on the In-
ternet, an emerging technological force with obvious enduring and
widespread societal effects.111 In addition, the court had to address
106. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 295-96.
109. Id. at 297.
110. Id. at 299.
111. Another noteworthy parallel linking International Shoe and Zippo is that while both de-
cisions created a novel test for jurisdiction, both cases would have been easy to resolve under
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the concept of universal jurisdiction spawned by the Inset line of cases.
Both International Shoe and Zippo demonstrated judicial imagination
in forging a new approach to personal jurisdiction, 1 2 while intending
to remain true to long-standing jurisdictional principles."13
The Court in International Shoe, in reinventing the then-prevailing
test of presence to determine personal jurisdiction, created a test that
would remain viable in the modern economy, reflect the prolific
growth of interstate commerce, and expand the reach of jurisdic-
tion.114 Commentators have typically viewed the International Shoe
decision as responding to an economic environment far different from
the one when Pennoyer was decided, an economy that in 1945 was
driven by radically improved modes of transportation and communi-
cation.115 The Court in International Shoe discounted the Pennoyer
notion that the forum state could subject a corporation to jurisdiction
if the corporation were present in the forum state as simply an exer-
cise in circular reasoning, a rule that "beg[ged] the question to be de-
then-existing doctrine. In International Shoe, the defendant's business practices and gross sales
surely demonstrated its presence in the forum. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 19, at
806-08. Likewise, the fact that the defendant in Zippo had some three thousand forum subscrib-
ers for its Internet news service and also had contracts with several Internet Service Providers in
the forum would have made the case easy to decide under the expansive reach of Inset. See
Michael Traynor & Laura Pirri, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Emerging Trends and Fu-
ture Directions, 712 PLI/PAT 93, 113 (2002) (asserting that "the Zippo defendant was unques-
tionably conducting business over the Internet with forum residents").
112. See Arthur R. Miller, Remark, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991,
996 (2004) (describing the Zippo decision as "very, very forward thinking"). But see Allan R.
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Age, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due
Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 411, 430 (2004) (calling the
Zippo test "an egregious failure of legal imagination").
113. Asserting that the International Shoe and Pennoyer decisions are congruent, Professor
Stein said, "When viewed from a broader perspective ... International Shoe is consistent with
Pennoyer's conceptual framework. After International Shoe, the relationship of the Constitution
to state court personal jurisdiction remained intact; the Court refined and reworked, rather than
rejected, its theories of the legitimate scope of state authority." Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argu-
ment and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 693-94
(1987).
114. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 423 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("The vast expansion of our national economy during the past several de-
cades had provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a State's
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.").
115. See, e.g., Cameron & Johnson, supra note 19, at 779 ("[International Shoe] is a product of
its times, an era of rapidly increasing interstate commerce, as demonstrated by large business'
increasing use of traveling salesmen across the country."). Interestingly, however, the Court in
International Shoe did not explicitly indicate that the minimum contacts test it created was
driven by changes in the commercial world. Perhaps an explicit recognition of such changes
would have been too obvious to state. Some years later, the Court did remark that the expan-
sion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations was "attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy." McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
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cided. 11 6 Instead, a corporation's presence in the forum state should
be determined by examining the "activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it."u 17
By the same token, the Zippo decision, while honoring and rooting
itself in the traditional model of jurisdiction, 118 announced a new ana-
lytical model for assessing purposeful availment in the context of In-
ternet activities. The Zippo decision, as did International Shoe,
described a continuum upon which the defendant's contacts with the
forum state could be placed. The International Shoe Court's descrip-
tion of the minimum contacts test may be viewed as a type of sliding
scale that requires examining the level and quality of the defendant's
activity in the forum state and the relationship of that activity to the
plaintiff's lawsuit.11 9 The Court described a continuum of contacts
with the forum ranging from the single or occasional act to continuous
and substantial acts.120 In elaborating upon its new paradigm for per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Court contrasted two situations, one that un-
questionably would suffice to establish personal jurisdiction, and one
that undoubtedly would not. Jurisdiction is proper when the corpora-
tion's activities "have not only been continuous and systematic, but
also give rise to the liabilities sued on."1121 On the other hand, jurisdic-
tion defies due process when "the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation's behalf" are unrelated to the lawsuit. 122 Simi-
larly, in Zippo, by placing websites on a continuum ranging from pas-
sive sites, which merely convey information, all the way to websites
that function as highly interactive, self-contained profit centers, the
court implicitly declared its allegiance to the minimum contacts model
of jurisdiction. The Zippo court extended the minimum contacts
model to a new technology, and did so in a way that linked the novel,
yet essential, aspects of the new medium to well established notions of
purposeful availment.
Finally, the minimum contacts test adopted in International Shoe
and the sliding scale rule adopted in Zippo are both extremely flexible
rules. The Zippo test places all Internet activity on its continuum of
116. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
117. Id.
118. In setting forth the constitutional basis for its sliding scale test, the court observed that a
defendant need not have "'physically enter[ed] the forum state"' to be subject to jurisdiction.
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
119. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18.
120. Id. at 317-19.
121. Id. at 317.
122. Id.
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interactivity. In International Shoe, the Court readily admitted that
the minimum contacts test it had set forth would not lend itself to
ready and certain application in many future cases. t23 The inherent
flexibility of each test has been assailed as being difficult to apply and
far too capable of leading to inconsistent results. The minimum con-
tacts standard would come to be criticized as creating and fostering
uncertainty, since its flexibility, according to its critics, would make it
a difficult standard to apply consistently. 124 Nevertheless, Interna-
tional Shoe stands as a remarkably influential and durable decision
that has survived for over half a century by establishing a flexible way
of analyzing personal jurisdiction issues that generate from a commer-
cial world shaped by revolutionary technological advances.
As the lightening rod of Internet jurisdiction, Zippo, while a district
court decision, has also profoundly influenced personal jurisdiction,
albeit in the narrower realm of Internet activities. The Zippo decision
turned the tide on the Inset line of cases that seemingly promoted uni-
versal jurisdiction based on the accessibility of the defendant's web-
site. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant simply
because the defendant has advertised on its website "would have a
devastating impact on those who use this global service." 125 Inset and
its progeny alarmed some commentators, fueling the fear that expan-
123. The Court stated:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activi-
ties which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot
be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been
suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through
its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less.... Whether due process is
satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in question in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure.
Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Essay, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (contending that
"[a]mbiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test for the more than five
decades during which it has served as the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine"); Daniel Steurer, Comment, The Shoe Fits and the Lighter Is Out of Gas: The
Continuing Utility of International Shoe and the Misuse and Ineffectiveness of Zippo, 74 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 319, 325 (2003) (asserting that "[t]he [minimum contacts] test, which can be
described as one of reasonableness, left lower courts and commentators with little guidance as to
how many contacts would support a finding of jurisdiction" (footnotes omitted)).
125. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); see also Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or.
1999) (stating that expansive assertions of jurisdiction raise the problem of "dramatically chilling
what may well be the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and
indeed the world-has yet seen"); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097,
at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (observing that early decisions were based on websites accessible
to all Internet users and thus finding universal jurisdiction).
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sive findings of jurisdiction, like other forms of regulation, would
stymie the commercial possibilities of the Internet.12 6 The impact of
expansive jurisdictional rules would disproportionately harm smaller
businesses operating on thinner margins or generating relatively small
revenues.12 7 Expansive assertions of jurisdiction threaten the egalita-
rian nature of the Internet, which seemingly levels the commercial
playing field by allowing businesses of modest means to compete in a
regional, national, or even international marketplace, at a cost small in
comparison to traditional bricks-and-mortar commerce.12 8 Whether
Zippo's influence,12 9 or more precisely the Zippo rule itself, should
extend for sixty years or more, as has the International Shoe doctrine,
is the subject of the next section.
IV. REINVENTING Zippo: A RETURN TO BASIC PRINCIPLES
While courts and commentators alike initially found much to laud in
the Zippo assertion that operating a passive website was an insuffi-
cient contact for purposes of personal jurisdiction, the Zippo rule has
been attacked increasingly by a growing chorus of courts and com-
mentators.1 30 The vast middle area of the Zippo spectrum-where
the website enables users to exchange information with the website
operator-has created a black hole of doubt and confusion, as courts
have struggled with the question of whether an interactive site consti-
126. "By continuing to focus on the medium, continued court interference with online activity
will stifle the growth of e-commerce because Website owners cannot tell in which forum their
online behavior will subject them to suit." Bales & Van Wert, supra note 13, at 49.
127. See Christopher McWhinney et al., The "Sliding Scale" of Personal Jurisdiction via the
Internet, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1 (cautioning that "[s]maller start-up companies should be
especially wary of the possibility of being named a defendant in a distant forum due to the
company's Internet activity").
128. See Burk, supra note 15, at 60. Professor Burk argues:
But the prospect of multijurisdictional liability may very well raise the price of partici-
pation beyond the average citizen's reach. Much of the network's democratizing influ-
ence may be lost if liability deters all but the most heavily capitalized entrepreneurs
from pursuing all but the most highly profitable ventures. The average user simply
cannot afford the cost of defending multiple suits in multiple jurisdictions, or of com-
plying with the regulatory requirements of every jurisdiction she might electronically
touch.
Id.
129. One commentator stated that the Zippo test "has been cited as a mantra in almost every
Internet jurisdiction decision that has followed Zippo." Jeremy Gilman, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Internet: Traditional Jurisprudence for a New Medium, 56 Bus. LAw. 395, 399 (2000).
130. Some commentators have found that the Zippo rule, having stemmed what appeared to
be a growing tide of universal jurisdiction based on mere website accessibility, has now outlived
its usefulness. See Bales & Van Wert, supra note 13, at 49 (noting that "[wihile [Zippo] provided
an adequate starting point for analysis in 1996, technological advances and growing public famili-
arity with the intricate workings of the Internet have rendered this test obsolete" (footnote
omitted)).
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tutes purposeful availment. 131 The rule has been denigrated as being
difficult to apply and incapable of consistent application.
132 Com-
pounding the problem is that, unlike the situation in 1997 when Zippo
was decided, most websites today have interactive features.
33
In addition, even though the Zippo test arose from a trademark dis-
pute and the jurisdictional issue was squarely centered on specific ju-
risdiction, courts soon adopted and applied the Zippo test in
substantively divergent cases, as well as applying the test to general
jurisdiction issues.134 The result has been the inappropriate transfor-
mation of the Zippo test into an all-purpose test for Internet jurisdic-
tion issues. Simplicity is certainly a virtue, and a uniform solution to
the apparently perplexing issue of Internet jurisdiction undoubtedly
has allure. But a one-size-fits-all approach to Internet jurisdiction is
too simplistic, especially since the traditional model of personal juris-
diction encompasses a variety of approaches based on the substantive
and factual aspects of the lawsuit to determine purposeful availment.
The Supreme Court has developed a distinct personal jurisdiction test
for cases involving defective products, 135 breach of contract,136 and
defamation, 137 among others. In addition, the Court has described a
test-or at least broadly outlined a test-for general jurisdiction. 138
Thus, an analysis of personal jurisdiction involving Internet conduct
that is confined to one particular framework applicable to all kinds of
131. Zippo did provide some guidance in how courts should assess the middle ground: When
the defendant's website allows the user to exchange information with the defendant, the court
should consider the "level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of infor-
mation." Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
132. Bales & Van Wert, supra note 13, at 32 (asserting that "because of the ambiguity of the
classification of an 'interactive' Website, courts were, and are, still forced to attempt to pigeon-
hole virtual presence into traditional rules requiring physical presence"); Reid, supra note 13, at
265 (stating that "this gray area on the continuum is troublesome because courts have few guide-
lines for assessing the quality and nature of these contacts"); Traynor & Pirri, supra note 111, at
113 (arguing that "[tihe Zippo framework is flawed because it gives significance to a concept of
interactivity about which neither the Zippo case itself, nor the cases that supposedly defined the
test, provide any guidance").
133. TiTi Nguyen, Note, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return
to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519, 537 (2004).
134. See infra Parts IV.C & IV.D.
135. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
136. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
137. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984).
138. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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Internet activity and all types of claims conflicts with the traditional
model.
A. Infringement Actions-Should the Middle Level of the Zippo
Scale Be Abolished?
In trademark infringement actions, resolving personal jurisdiction
issues is easy when defendants have engaged in cybersquatting, the
practice of registering a domain name known to be another's trade-
mark with the intent of selling the domain name to the trademark
holder. In cybersquatting cases, the courts have had little difficulty in
ruling that the defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction in
the plaintiff's home state because the defendant has essentially kid-
napped the domain name to extort money from the rightful posses-
sor.139 Because cybersquatting is essentially an intentional tort, the
proper test for determining personal jurisdiction is the effects test,
rather than the Zippo test.
In infringement cases involving less egregious conduct, the personal
jurisdiction issue may not be so easily resolved, as difficult issues often
arise as to whether the alleged infringer has purposefully availed itself
in a particular state. If the defendant's website targets the states in
which the plaintiff conducts business, then such targeting supports a
finding of personal jurisdiction in any of those states.140 Thus, courts
have found that, in the absence of sales to the forum state, the defen-
dant has demonstrated purposeful availment by operating a website
that targets the forum state in a bid to do business there. 141 What
constitutes targeting, however, has not been clearly delineated. 142
Courts have held that seemingly innocuous, generic statements on a
139. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Maintaining that cybersquatting cases are akin to intentional tort cases, the court applied the
"effects test" announced in Calder, 465 U.S. at 783. Id.
140. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (D.
Or. 1999).
141. See, e.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neogen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002); ALS
Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Desktop Tech., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. &
Design, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999).
142. Stein, supra note 112, at 433 (predicting that "[it will be rare in the Internet context for
a defendant to 'directly target' its website at a particular state if that requires a defendant to seek
out forum business in a manner distinct from its web-marketing generally" (footnote omitted)).
Some commentators have endorsed a test for targeting that involves a technologically and factu-
ally sophisticated analysis of targeting. See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There?
Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1352 (2001).
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website evidence targeting the forum state. 143 Additionally, and more
problematically, courts have sometimes equated targeting of the fo-
rum with the mere fact that the website is interactive.1
44
For purposes of clarity and consistency in determining whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state, the dividing
line separating passive from active websites should be whether forum
residents have made purchases online. Under this proposed rule,
Zippo's murky middle level of interactivity would be abolished. In-
stead of a sliding scale, a website should be placed in one of two cate-
gories: revenue-generating websites and all other websites. In
infringement actions, websites generating revenue from the forum
state would demonstrate purposeful availment, whereas non-revenue
generating websites would not. Operating a website through which
residents in the forum state have completed transactions should cer-
tainly constitute purposeful availment.
145
An active website is one that not only allows a consumer to initiate
and complete a transaction directly through the website, but also one
which forum state residents have actually used to complete transac-
143. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, ruled that a blood-testing company
purposefully availed itself in Michigan when its website proclaimed that "it will 'do a genetic
newborn screening test for any parent in any state,' and enable[d] Michigan residents to print
out the testing form to send along with payment." Neogen, 282 F.3d at 891 (citation omitted);
see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 45 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
significant that the defendant's website mentioned that the defendant had performed services for
a company located in the forum state). The necessity, and inherent ambiguity, of scrutinizing a
website for clues evidencing targeting of the forum would be eliminated under my proposed rule.
Thus, the personal jurisdiction issue in Neogen, under my proposal, could be resolved by deter-
mining whether and to what extent the defendant had provided services to consumers in
Michigan.
144. Some courts have emphasized the potential for forum residents to complete transactions
online as overriding whether forum residents actually have completed transactions. See, e.g.,
First Tenn. Nat'l Corp. v. Horizon Nat'l Bank, 225 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (ruling
that the defendant's maintenance of a website that allows forum residents to transact business
sufficed to establish purposeful availment, even though the plaintiff failed to allege that the
defendant had ever transacted business with forum residents); Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, LLC, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1078-81 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that the defendant purposefully availed itself of
forum by operating a website that allowed consumers to purchase the defendant's products, even
though there was no proof that a forum resident had ever transacted business with defendant).
But see, e.g., Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C 4943, 1997 WL 733905, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1997) (finding defendant's website insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction
because plaintiff did not allege that defendant conducted business with forum residents via its
website).
145. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant, a domain
name registration company, had purposefully availed itself of the forum state because forum
state consumers had completed transactions via the company's website); Arista Records, Inc. v.
Sukfield Holding Co. S.L., 314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31-34 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that defendant's
subscription-based music download service constituted purposeful availment of the forum).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1147
tions.146 On the other hand, if the website lacks the ability for con-
sumers to engage in an online transaction, then the courts should
conclude that the website is passive. 147
Even those websites that offer more than just information about the
defendant's goods or services yet stop short of having consumers con-
summate transactions online should be considered passive. For exam-
ple, a website should be considered passive even when the site
provides contact information, such as mailing addresses, toll-free
numbers, and e-mail addresses, or allows users to print out order
forms, so long as purchases cannot be electronically executed via the
site. 148 This level of interactivity is analogous to advertising in na-
tional publications and thus should be insufficient to demonstrate pur-
poseful availment. 149 Of course, if, after receiving more information
146. See, e.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(concluding that online brokerage firm's website was active when website allowed forum re-
sidents to conduct a host of financial online activities). In one case, in which the defendant
published a satirical publication, known as the Annals of Improbable Research, the court found
that the defendant's activities in the forum state were insufficient for specific jurisdiction, even
though the defendant had sixty subscribers in the forum and sold on average fewer than sixty
issues per month at newsstands. Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97 C 5453, 1997 WL 299678 (N.D. Ill.
May 29, 1998). In examining the defendant's website, which allowed users to subscribe to a
"mini" version of the publication sent by e-mail, the court found the website insufficiently inter-
active since the e-mail subscription was free and the only advertising in the mini-version was for
defendant's own products. Id. at *5.
147. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Miskin Scraper Works, Inc.. 256 F. Supp. 849. 853 (C.D. I11.
2003) (concluding, in a trade dress action, that a website was passive when the site provided
product and contact information but did not facilitate online purchasing); David White Instru-
ments, LLC v. TLZ, Inc., No. 02 C 7156, 2003 WL 21148224, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2003)
(concluding that defendant's website was passive since consumers could not purchase products
directly from the site but could through an "unaffiliated" website); Haggerty Enters., Inc. v.
Lipan Indus. Co., No. 00 C 766, 2001 WL 968592, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2001) (ruling defen-
dant not subject to specific jurisdiction because its website, while providing information about
defendant's products, did not list prices and because there was no proof that the defendant ever
transacted business directly from its website); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 466
(E.D. Pa. 1999); Desktop Tech., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-5029,
1999 WL 98572 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
148. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999). Passive web-
sites should also include those websites that allow users to enter their address prompting the
website to list local stores selling the defendant's products. See, e.g., David White Instruments,
2003 WL 21148224, at *6; Desktop Tech., 1999 WL 98572, at *6.
149. Generally, Internet advertising ought to be likened to advertising in national publica-
tions, and a few courts, in extending the analogy beyond specific jurisdiction, have found that
Internet advertising cannot subject a defendant to general jurisdiction. See, e.g., David White
Instruments, 2003 WL 21148224, at *6; Aero Prods. Int'l, Inc. v. Intex Corp., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1772,
1777 (N.D. I11. 2002). The analogy is sensible in that both forms of advertising typically do not
target residents in any particular state.
On the other hand, the Internet has been distinguished from television and radio broadcasting,
in that the geographic scope of broadcasting is limited, whereas a website's accessibility knows
no borders. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (stating that "given the nature of the internet
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through the website, forum residents make purchases through tradi-
tional methods like telephone and mail, those sales should be factored
as contacts within the existing model of personal jurisdiction.
A thoughtful decision where a court pointed out the deficiencies in
equating purposeful availment with interactivity is Millennium Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, which involved a trademark dis-
pute between music retailers on opposite coasts of the United States.
The defendant owned retail music stores in South Carolina known as
"Millennium Music, '150 which was the dispute's focal point. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant operated websites and both sold products
through their websites. 151 The defendant, however, generated scant
revenue from its website.152
In ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, the court
decided that the defendant's capability of selling compact discs
through its website did not satisfy the requirement of "doing business"
over the Internet because the requirement can only be satisfied when
the defendant conducts a significant portion of its business through
ongoing Internet relationships. 153 The court stated that an example of
"doing business" is when a company enters "into contracts with re-
sidents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet.
1 54
The court concluded that the defendant did nothing more than pub-
lish an interactive website.155 The defendant did not purposefully
transact business with Oregon residents through the Internet, other
than in one instance,1 56 nor did the defendant otherwise exchange files
and the inability to place geographical restrictions on its use as we can do with a radio or televi-
sion broadcast, it does not necessarily follow that every internet entry into the forum state
should give rise to personal jurisdiction").
Another distinction sometimes made between websites and traditional advertising media, such
as newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting, is that a person browsing the web must take "af-
firmative action to access either a passive or interactive Website." Millennium Enterprises, Inc.
v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999). Thus, the mere possibility that a
website, whether passive or interactive, may be viewed in the forum, by itself, fails to rise to the
level of purposeful availment. A "Website is not automatically projected to a user's computer
without invitation as are advertisements in a newspaper or on the television and radio. Rather,
the user must take affirmative action to access either a passive or interactive Website." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 908.
152. Id. Virtually all of the defendant's sales were from its retail store operations. In the six
months prior to the lawsuit, the defendant's Website garnered only $225, compared with its
overall retail sales of $2,180,000. Id. at 909.
153. Millenium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. The one and only sale arose when the plaintiff's attorney asked a fellow Oregonian to
purchase a product from the defendant's website. Id. at 911. The plaintiff claimed that the
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electronically with forum residents so as to create "repeated" or
"ongoing obligations.' 1 57
According to the court, defendant's website could not be consid-
ered simply passive because the website allowed the defendant and
interested visitors to exchange information. 158 Thus, the defendant's
website fell into the middle category, requiring inquiry into the "level
of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of informa-
tion" to determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised. 159 The
court correctly noted that the possibility that forum residents could
complete transactions through the defendant's website would not, by
itself, constitute purposeful availment.
As typified by the Millennium view, the type of activity that consti-
tutes targeting may either consist of transactions completed in the fo-
rum state or other acts tending to show the defendant directly or
indirectly sought to serve the forum state. 160 Under my proposed
bright-line rule, however, the Millennium court's analysis into the
level of interactivity and targeting would be unnecessary. The defen-
dant's website would be considered passive because no forum citizen,
other than the one prompted by the plaintiff's attorney, had pur-
chased products from the website. As interactive websites become the
norm, my proposal will result in more consistent decisions because the
proposal avoids judicial examination of the nature and quality of the
website's interactive features.
defendant's sale of one compact disc (CD) to an Oregon resident constituted purposeful avail-
ment of Oregon, because the sale occurred after the defendant "had solicited sales over the
Internet in the state of Oregon." Id. The court disagreed with the plaintiff, finding that the
plaintiff had prompted the resident to buy the CD, and therefore the sale amounted to nothing
more than the plaintiff's attempt to manufacture a contact with Oregon for the sole purpose of
establishing personal jurisdiction. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff can hardly argue that
such action "caused a likelihood of confusion" regarding the plaintiff's and defendant's trade
names; the resident who purchased the CD knew exactly with whom she was dealing and thus
knew that the defendant was not associated in any way with the plaintiff. Millenium, 33 F. Supp.
2d. at 911; see also Haggerty Enters., 2001 WL 968592, at *4 (discounting the fact that plaintiff's
employees purchased the defendant's products in the forum state, because two of the three
purchases took place after the complaint was filed).
157. Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920 (D. Or. 1999).
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
160. The test was advocated by Justice O'Connor in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. In Millennium, the
court held that the defendant's website failed to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or
purposefully targeted its activities at the forum state of Oregon. Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at
922. The website says "Come Visit Us!" and has a map showing the location of the defendant's
stores in South Carolina and local cross-streets. Id. The website plainly shows that the defen-
dant did not intend to target Oregon residents, some 3,000 miles away. Id. Therefore, the court
found that "something more" than just the website was required to extend jurisdiction over the
defendant. Id.
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This bright-line rule will better integrate the Zippo test into the ex-
isting model of personal jurisdiction. Adoption of the rule will better
advance significant policy interests recognized by the Supreme Court.
A company always must decide how it will market its wares, how it
will have consumers make purchases, and to whom it will sell. Each of
these decisions ordinarily comes about through deliberation and plan-
ning. A bright-line rule separating passive from active websites based
on whether consumers have completed transactions through a website
would allow companies engaged in Internet activity to better predict
where they may be sued, and thus would comport with the Supreme
Court's goal of making personal jurisdiction more predictable as an
essential aspect of due process. 161 Companies that seek to avoid juris-
diction by operating websites that do not facilitate online purchases
but that nevertheless allow consumers to complete transactions
through more traditional means will not be able to circumvent juris-
diction as courts can analyze those contacts using the traditional
model of jurisdiction.
A bright-line rule would promote certainty as to where a defendant
would be subject to personal jurisdiction. Ambiguous or overreaching
standards of personal jurisdiction will stifle companies from setting up
business on the Internet and stall commercial growth on the
Internet. 162
B. The Fallacy of a Uniform Solution to Internet Jurisdiction-
Recognizing the Limitations of Zippo
The cyberspace world, like the physical world, is host to a wide vari-
ety of communities and activities, 163 the forms and quantity of which
will continue to proliferate. Despite the heterogeneity of Internet ac-
tivity, as well as the diversity of claims involving Internet-related con-
161. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen said, "The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the
orderly administration of the laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 444 U.S. at 297 (citation
omitted).
162. Note, A Category-Specific Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction
Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2004) (noting that "[b]ecause website
owners have traditionally had to accept virtual entrance into every forum linked to the Internet
as part and parcel of the nature of their enterprise, they have also felt an acute need for predict-
ability in the personal jurisdiction laws of these forums" (footnote omitted)).
163. See, e.g., STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 51 (2001) (stating that "cyberspace can no longer
be viewed as a monolithic entity. There are in fact many different cyberspaces. Some of these
spaces are analogous to offline neighborhoods, such as shopping districts or red light districts.
Others may resemble insular offline communities and reflect a range of carefully defined social
norms.").
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duct, the courts have looked for an all-encompassing rule for Internet
jurisdiction. 164 And the one rule looked to more than any other as the
panacea for resolving all Internet jurisdiction issues is the sliding scale
test of Internet interactivity announced in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.165
Despite the understandable desire of those seeking a uniform rule
governing all Internet jurisdictional issues, the traditional model of
personal jurisdiction itself fails to support the notion that one test for
specific jurisdiction should be applied to all claims. A single standard
for Internet jurisdiction that would encompass all possible claims and
cyberspace activities is an aspiration neither sought nor realized for
jurisdiction based on less ethereal conduct. Rather, for specific juris-
diction, the Court has refined and tailored personal jurisdiction analy-
sis to assess the defendant's contacts with the forum state in light of
the plaintiff's claim. 166 Thus, for example, the Court's decision in Bur-
164. See Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 473, 481 (2004) (acknowledging that "the idea that all
Internet jurisdiction cases can be handled under a unitary rubric continues to have a powerful
hold on the way cases are actually decided"); Frederick H. Bicknese, Comment, Websites and
Personal Jurisdiction: When Should a Defendant's Internet Selling Activities Subject It to Suit in a
Plaintiff-Buyer's State, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 829, 830 (2000) (noting that "the leading Internet-juris-
diction cases have attempted to solve the problems presented in [different types of substantive
claims] under a single Internet-jurisdiction umbrella"). This attitude is not limited to the judici-
ary. Commentators have similarly argued for and come up with imaginative, yet all-encompass-
ing, unitary standards for analyzing Internet jurisdiction issues. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 13, at
260 (remarking that "a single consistent approach to evaluating the nature and quality of Web
contacts is essential for predictability and reliability," and setting forth a novel two-prong test);
see also Bales & Van Wert, supra note 13, at 22 (synthesizing various proposals for Internet
jurisdiction in creating "a single framework consisting of traditional tools [that] can be applied
by the courts in an area of constant change-the Internet"). But see Note, supra note 162, at
1623 (endorsing a "category-specific" approach to Internet jurisdiction that differentiates be-
tween "commercial and noncommercial websites" but calling for Congress to legislate in that
area).
165. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). For a discussion of the case, see supra Part III.B. The
influence of Zippo has been widely noted. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and
Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction through Data Privacy, 98 Nw.
U. L. REV. 493, 496 (2004) (calling the Zippo test "the leading jurisdiction standard within the
United States"); Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determin-
ing Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAW. 601, 601-02 (2003) (noting that the Zippo
test, along with the effects test, is one of two principal tests used in assessing Internet jurisdic-
tion); Bicknese, supra note 164, at 842 (noting that "[c]ourts have cited Zippo as the leading
authority on Internet-jurisdiction so often it is as if the United States Supreme Court issued the
opinion").
166. Speaking broadly about specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated, "When a contro-
versy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that
a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of
in personam jurisdiction." Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)); see also Diamond Healthcare of
Ohio, Inc. v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, 229 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir. 2000) (declaring that
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ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 16 7 is the seminal case examining personal
jurisdiction in a breach of contract case. Also, World-Wide Volk-
swagen and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia168 are the seminal cases examining personal jurisdiction in tort
claims involving defective products. In addition, the Court's opinions
in Calder v. Jones169 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.170 are au-
thoritative in assessing personal jurisdiction in defamation cases, and
perhaps in all intentional tort cases. 171 Any consideration of specific
jurisdiction, therefore, must take into account the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state and their connection, or lack thereof, with
the factual and legal crux of the lawsuit.
For an example of a case that explicitly linked the substantive and
factual basis of the plaintiff's claim with the defendant's Internet ac-
tivities in the forum state, one need look no further than Zippo itself.
Zippo Manufacturing sued Zippo Dot Com over the latter's use of
"Zippo" in its various domain names, in its website, and in the head-
ers of the newsgroup messages accessed by its subscribers.172 The
court explicitly found that "the cause of action arises out of Dot
Com's forum-related conduct" in this case.' 73 The court noted that
because Pennsylvania subscribers to the defendant's service retrieve
newsgroup messages with "Zippo" prominently featured in the head-
ers, "both a significant amount of the alleged infringement and dilu-
tion, and resulting injury have occurred in Pennsylvania. 1 74 The
court further noted that because Zippo Manufacturing was based in
Pennsylvania, "a substantial amount of the injury from the alleged
wrongdoing is likely to occur in Pennsylvania.' 75 Thus, the court had
little difficulty in concluding that Zippo Manufacturing's claims of
"[i]n the absence of continuous and systematic contacts, a court may still exercise specific per-
sonal jurisdiction when the contacts relate to the cause of action and create a substantial connec-
tion with the forum state." (citation omitted)).
167. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
168. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
169. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
170. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
171. One court explained that
[t]he effects test is satisfied when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed an
intentional tort expressly aimed at the forum state; the actions caused harm, the brunt
of which was suffered in the forum state; and the defendant knew that the effects of its
actions would be suffered primarily in the forum state.
Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1165 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (citing
Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-98; Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985)).
172. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
173. Id. at 1127.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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trademark violation arose directly from Zippo Dot Com's systematic
contacts with the forum state.176
As useful as the Zippo sliding scale test may be in infringement
actions, 177 it is imprudent to apply the test to all personal jurisdiction
issues in all claims that hinge solely or partly on the defendant's In-
ternet activities. For example, the inappropriate extension of the
Zippo test is illustrated in cases where the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant's website has defamed the plaintiff.1 78 Many websites are
devoted solely to providing information or opinions and do not solicit
or transact business of any kind. In the parlance of Zippo, these sites
are purely passive. If a passive site contains defamatory statements,
how should an analysis of personal jurisdiction proceed? A straight-
forward application of Zippo presumably would conclude that a non-
resident defendant website author would not be subject to personal
jurisdiction. Yet, the Zippo test is inappropriate because the interac-
tivity of the site, or lack thereof, may have little or nothing to do with
the harm suffered by the plaintiff and thus should have little or no
relevance in determining personal jurisdiction in a defamation case. 179
Rather, the effects test as described in Calder and Keeton should be
the applicable test. The website, for defamation purposes, can legiti-
mately be analogized with traditional means of communication, such
as the print media, radio, and television. Despite the apparent obvi-
ousness of these assertions, in cases involving Internet libel, courts
have relied more often on the Zippo test than on the Supreme Court
decisions.180
176. Id.
177. The utility of the Zippo test in its current form may be debatable. See supra Part IV.A.
178. See, e.g., Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 404 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Barrett v.
Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998).
179. Moreover, the proper test for jurisdiction would not be based on the defendant's com-
mercial activities directed toward the state or whether a contract entered into between the plain-
tiff and the defendant has a substantial nexus with the forum state.
180. In his excellent article that delves deep into Internet libel jurisdiction, Dean Borchers
said, "When one stops to consider that in these cases a district court opinion in a trademark
dispute is commanding more attention than a Supreme Court opinion on libel jurisdiction, one
sees that there is fertile soil for confusion." Borchers, supra note 164, at 481. Not all courts,
however, have found Zippo applicable in defamation cases. See, e.g., Planet Beach Franchising
Corp. v. C3ubit, Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-1859, 2002 WL 1870007, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2002)
(observing that "[t]here is good reason to maintain the same jurisdictional standard for Internet
communications as that which applies to print communications: to hold otherwise would give
publishers an incentive to disseminate libelous speech via the medium with the more restrictive
standard"). This Article will go no further in plumbing the mystery surrounding the odd and
misplaced reliance on the Zippo test in Internet libel cases, except to assert that this reliance
simply bolsters the contention that courts often fail to take into account the relationship between
the claim and the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
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C. Contracting Over the Internet
In breach of contract cases, courts have had some difficulty in as-
sessing the impact of Internet conduct on the personal jurisdiction is-
sue. One tendency is to overinflate the significance of the Internet
activity at issue rather than appropriately weighing the Internet con-
duct in the context of the transaction as a whole. For example, in
Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp.,
181
the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that no contractual rela-
tionship existed between the plaintiff and the defendants. The action
arose when the defendants responded to a solicitation for capital on
plaintiff's website for a company that the plaintiff was starting in Indi-
ana. 182 The parties communicated and negotiated with each other in
the following ways: telephone, ordinary mail, and e-mail. 183 Because
the parties exchanged over eighty e-mails with one another, the court
seemed eager to apply the Zippo test.' 84 The court found that the
"numerous and continuous" communication through e-mail in the
parties' negotiations relating to a startup corporation that would be
chartered in Indiana subjected the defendants to personal jurisdiction
in Indiana.185 The court's enthusiasm in using the Zippo test may be
inferred from the court's analysis of jurisdiction, which focuses almost
solely on the e-mail communications, even though the parties' negoti-
ations also took place through the faxing of documents, meetings in
person, and conference calls.186 While the court correctly decided the
issue, its zeal in applying the Zippo test was certainly an over-enthusi-
astic response given the nature of the negotiations.
187
181. No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567, at *1, 3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Id. at *6.
186. Id. at *2.
187. In other situations, the fact that a contract was entered into directly through the defen-
dant's website was held to be insufficient evidence of website interactivity. For example, one
court interpreted the Zippo sliding scale test so literally that the court held that the defendant
did not purposefully avail itself of the forum state, even though the defendant had sold nearly
$40,000 worth of beer to forum residents via its website. Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp.
2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2000). In Butler, the defendant, an Illinois vendor, was sued in Ala-
bama for allegedly selling beer through its website to a minor. Id. at 1262-63. The court seem-
ingly interpreted the Zippo standard regarding the exchange of information through the
defendant's website, which would establish that the site is interactive, as differing from the com-
pletion of a sale via the site, which the court implied would not be an interactive feature of a
website. Id. at 1268. The court said, "[The defendant's] site does not even anticipate the regular
exchange of information across the Internet, much less provide for such interaction. Rather, it is
closer to an electronic version of a postal reply card; the limited degree of interactivity available
on the defendants' website is certainly insufficient" to subject the defendants to personal juris-
diction. Id.
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Rather than using Zippo as the framework for assessing personal
jurisdiction in contract actions, courts should turn to Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 188 which embodies the U.S. Supreme Court's
most extensive analysis of personal jurisdiction in a breach of contract
lawsuit. The Court noted that the analysis of purposeful availment
hinges on whether the contract at issue has a substantial nexus to the
forum state. 189 Burger King Corp., a restaurant franchiser, sued two
defendants operating one of its franchises for breach of contract.
Even though the franchise in question was in Michigan, Burger King
filed the lawsuit in Florida, where its corporate headquarters were
located.
The Court initially noted that a nonresident's contractual relation-
ship with a party residing in the forum state would not, by itself, lead
to personal jurisdiction. 190 Echoing the International Shoe incantation
that jurisdiction cannot be determined by rigid rules, the Court stated,
"Instead, we have emphasized the need for a 'highly realistic' ap-
proach that recognizes that a 'contract' is 'ordinarily but an intermedi-
ate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future
consequences which themselves are the real object of the business
transaction.' 191 The Court listed several specific factors that should
be assessed in determining whether the contractual relationship estab-
lishes that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the forum
state. The Court emphasized these factors-"prior negotiations and
contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the con-
tract and the parties' actual course of dealing"-as the ones courts
should evaluate in determining "whether [the] defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum. ' 192
The Court held that the franchise agreement did have a substantial
connection to Florida. The Court found it significant that the fran-
chisee had initiated the contact with Burger King that led to the nego-
tiations and the execution of the franchise agreement,t 93 and that the
agreement, while lacking a forum selection clause, contained a choice-
of-law clause specifying that Florida law would govern disputes arising
188. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
189. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (noting that the split among lower courts was "whether and
to what extent a contract can constitute a 'contact' for purposes of due process analysis" (foot-
note omitted)).
190. Id. at 478 (stating that "[i]f the question is whether an individual's contract with an out-
of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's
home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot").
191. Id. at 479 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
1178 [Vol. 54:1147
INTERNET PERSONAL JURISDICTION
from the contract. 194 The Court also emphasized that the contract
created a long-term relationship between Burger King and the fran-
chisee potentially lasting up to twenty years, 195 and that the franchisee
routinely sent payments to Burger King in Florida. 196
Similarly, Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.197 exem-
plifies how a court can correctly apply the traditional model of per-
sonal jurisdiction in a breach of contract action involving cyberspace
activities. In Pres-Kap, the plaintiff, who owned and operated a com-
puter database containing updated airline reservation information,
sued a New York travel agency for breach of contract in a Florida
state court.198 The plaintiff's operations and computer system were in
Florida. The only contacts between the defendant and Florida were
that the defendant sent its payments to Florida and that the defendant
electronically accessed airline reservation information stored on the
plaintiff's computer system in Florida. 99 The court found these con-
tacts insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the
defendant.200
The court found that the nexus of the contractual dispute was
clearly in New York, rather than Florida.20' The court stated that,
even though the contract contained a Florida choice-of-law provision,
the transaction was based in New York.20 2 The plaintiff had made the
sales pitch to the defendant in New York, the parties negotiated and
executed the contract in New York, and the plaintiff serviced the con-
tract in New York.20 3 While the record failed to establish whether the
defendant knew that it was accessing a computer system in Florida,
the court found that this knowledge "clearly would have been of little
importance to [the defendant]. '20 4
The court cited public policy in support of its holding. Finding juris-
diction solely because the defendant had accessed a computer
database in the forum state, according to the court, would be an over-
expansive assertion of jurisdiction.20 5 Significantly, the court charac-
terized the defendant as a consumer of information rather than as an
194. Id. at 481-82.
195. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80.
196. Id. at 480.
197. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
198. Id. at 1352.
199. Id. at 1353.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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entrepreneur using the database for profit.20 6 The court justified its
characterization by noting society's extensive and growing reliance on
computer-assisted research.20 7 The court stated that a contrary hold-
ing would mean that consumers of online databases would be subject
to personal jurisdiction wherever the computer databases are located,
"even if such users, as here, are solicited, engaged, and serviced en-
tirely in-state by the supplier's local representatives. 20 8
CompuServe Corp. v. Patterson20 9 is another significant case de-
cided early in the evolution of Internet jurisdiction law. In Com-
puServe, however, the court improperly invoked and applied the
Burger King breach of contract analysis in a case where the cause of
action did not involve breach of contract. CompuServe involved a
trademark dispute case initiated by CompuServe Corp., an Internet
service provider based in Ohio, against its customer, Patterson, a
Texas software developer.210 CompuServe sought a judicial declara-
tion that the software it had begun selling did not infringe upon Pat-
terson's trademark rights in his own software that he was marketing,
selling, and distributing through CompuServe. CompuServe was not
only the conduit through which Patterson sold his software, but also
Patterson's Internet service provider.21' Patterson had been using
CompuServe's services to sell his software for three years, when he
learned that CompuServe had begun selling software similar to his.
Patterson communicated through e-mail with CompuServe, com-
plaining that CompuServe's software infringed upon his software. 212
CompuServe then filed a declaratory relief action against Patterson in
a federal district court in Ohio.213 Patterson succeeded in having the
case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 214
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that Patterson was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio be-
206. Id.
207. Id. (noting that "[l]awyers, journalists, teachers, physicians, courts, universities, and busi-
ness people throughout the country daily conduct various types of computer-assisted research
over telephone lines linked to supplier databases located in other states").
208. Id. One commentator, however, has taken the Pres-Kap decision to task for its failure to
recognize that the defendant's continuous use of the plaintiffs Florida computer system consti-
tuted purposeful availment. Santisi, supra note 6, at 444-45. In addition, the fact that the defen-
dant sent its monthly payment to plaintiff's office in Florida, and did so over a nine-year period,
demonstrated the additional conduct necessary to satisfy Justice O'Connor's awareness plus test
in Asahi. Id. at 446-47.
209. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
210. Id. at 1260.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1261.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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cause of his contacts with Ohio-based CompuServe.2 15 In holding that
jurisdiction was proper in Ohio, the court found that Patterson's con-
tacts with CompuServe, though taking place almost exclusively
through the Internet, demonstrated that he had purposefully availed
himself of Ohio.2 16 Patterson's shareware contract with CompuServe,
which was executed online, indicated that the contract was "entered
into in Ohio" and that Ohio law would govern any disputes.2 17 Patter-
son had to assent to the contractual provisions by typing
"AGREE. ' 218 Patterson used CompuServe's computer system in
Ohio for virtually all aspects of his shareware enterprise. 21 9 His reli-
ance on CompuServe transformed Patterson from a consumer of
CompuServe's services into an entrepreneur who used CompuServe's
computer system to further his business. 220 In addition, Patterson's
business relationship with CompuServe was ongoing, since he had
been selling his shareware via CompuServe's system for the three
years leading up to the lawsuit.2 21 Moreover, Patterson repeatedly
communicated with CompuServe by e-mail. 222
With a nod towards World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal, the
court noted that Patterson's injection of his shareware into the stream
of commerce was not enough to render him amenable to the personal
jurisdiction of Ohio.22 3 For additional guidance, the court turned to
Burger King.224 The court noted that it is not enough that a nonresi-
dent enter into a contract with a forum resident to subject the nonresi-
dent to personal jurisdiction. 225 Nevertheless, the court emphasized
that Patterson's relationship with CompuServe went beyond that of
merely contracting with a forum corporation and of sending his
shareware into the stream of commerce. 226 Patterson used Com-
puServe's computer operations in Ohio to handle virtually all aspects
of his software business from the distribution of the software to the
payment his customers made to him.227 Patterson's contacts with
CompuServe demonstrated that he had purposefully availed himself
215. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1269.
216. Id. at 1266.
217. Id. at 1260.
218. Id. at 1260-61.
219. Id. at 1267.
220. Id. at 1268.
221. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265.
222. Id. at 1261.
223. Id. at 1265.
224. Id. at 1266.
225. Id. at 1265-66.
226. Id. at 1265.
227. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1255-56.
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of the privileges and benefits of conducting his business through
Ohio.2 28
Most commentators complimented the CompuServe decision as cor-
rectly applying the traditional model of jurisdiction in assessing the
contacts between Patterson and CompuServe. 229 It is true that, even
though all of the meaningful contacts between CompuServe and Pat-
terson took place in cyberspace, the court attempted to remain faith-
ful to the traditional model by applying traditional principles of
jurisdiction to these virtual contacts. 230
The problem with the CompuServe decision, however, is that the
court applied the wrong test. The court's reliance on Burger King was
misplaced in that the issue before the court was not whether Patterson
had breached his contract with CompuServe. The issue was whether
CompuServe, based upon its own software that it was marketing, had
infringed upon any trademarks belonging to Patterson as to the names
of his software products. 231 CompuServe's claim, therefore, was not
connected with its Shareware Registration agreement with Patter-
son.232 Significantly, the agreement did "not mention Patterson's
software by name; in fact, it leaves the content and identification of
228. Id. at 1266.
229. See, e.g., Joanna B. Bossin, Note, What Constitutes Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace Af-
ter CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson: Are New Rules Necessary for a New Regime?, 13 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 521, 538 (1997). Ms. Bossin asserted that
[a]lthough CompuServe involved personal jurisdiction issues occurring in virtual reality,
the court correctly chose to apply traditional jurisdictional rules and principles to the
facts. This decision reinforces the notion that courts can successfully use a traditional
minimum contacts analysis to determine whether a defendant has directed his activities
toward a forum state via the Internet.
Id.
230. Id. at 544-45 (lauding the CompuServe decision and noting that "[j]ust because the In-
ternet may be replacing traditional mediums of communication does not mean that courts can
and will do away with deeply rooted traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
On the other hand, the CompuServe decision has been criticized on the basis that there was
little evidence showing that Patterson knew the following: (1) that CompuServe was based in
Ohio and (2) that CompuServe's computer system, which facilitated Patterson's shareware busi-
ness, was in Ohio. Thus, while Patterson certainly did business with CompuServe, without proof
that he knew where CompuServe's operations were physically located, it cannot be established
that Patterson purposefully availed himself of doing business in Ohio. Jason L. Brodsky, Recent
Decision, Civil Procedure-Surfin' the Stream of Commerce: CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 70 TEMP. L. REV. 825, 851 (1997) (arguing that "neither the court nor the
reader of the CompuServe opinion may infer that because Patterson connected to the Com-
puServe network, he knew where the network was located, where his e-mail was being sent, or
where his software might be purchased").
231. CompuServe sought declaratory relief that it had not infringed upon Patterson's trade-
marks and that it had not engaged in unfair business practices. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
232. Professor Burk called CompuServe a "profoundly flawed opinion." Burk, supra note 15,
at 36. He further stated that "the presence of a contract in CompuServe was entirely irrelevant
to the due process calculation." Id. at 37.
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that software to Patterson. '233 Thus, the agreement itself lacked a
substantial nexus to the trademark issue.
The court, apparently sensing that its rationale analogizing the case
to Burger King was tenuous, found that Patterson's mail and e-mail
communications to CompuServe asserting that the company had in-
fringed upon his trademarks demonstrated that he had "purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio. ' 234 The
court, seemingly aware that these communications by themselves were
perhaps too thin to establish purposeful availment, clearly boot-
strapped Patterson's allegations of infringement onto his contract with
CompuServe and his selling of shareware through CompuServe.235
While the CompuServe decision "demonstrate[s] the difficulty that
courts will have extending the indistinct criteria of minimum contacts
into an electronic environment, '236 the decision is more remarkable
for its misguided reliance upon Burger King and the court's unyielding
insistence that the infringement action arose from Patterson's execu-
tion of the shareware agreement and his selling of shareware through
CompuServe. The court in CompuServe placed undue emphasis on
Patterson's use of CompuServe's computer system to sell and dis-
tribute his software. Patterson's reliance on CompuServe's services
had a trivial relationship with CompuServe's claim that its software
did not infringe upon Patterson's trademark rights.
Thus, the crucial question that the CompuServe decision resolved
unsatisfactorily is whether the defendant's contacts with the forum
state are sufficiently related to the lawsuit to support specific jurisdic-
tion. This nexus requirement cannot be satisfied simply on a showing
that the defendant has contacts with the forum state arising from In-
ternet activity. The contacts must be evaluated in light of the substan-
tive and factual allegations made in the complaint.
A nonresident defendant, for example, that solicits business and ne-
gotiates a contract through e-mail with a forum state resident may
have purposefully availed itself of the forum when the lawsuit arises
out of that solicitation or contract. In this situation, the Burger King
233. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260.
234. Id. at 1266. Discounting this contact, Professor Burk observed, "A jurisdictional rule
that discourages pre-litigation notification and possible settlements seems ill-considered at best,
and hardly in keeping with the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence." Burk, supra note
15, at 38.
235. The court concluded its analysis of purposeful availment by returning to Patterson's con-
tract and selling activities, stating that Patterson "knowingly reached out to CompuServe's Ohio
home, and he benefited from CompuServe's handling of his software and the fees that it gener-
ated." CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266-67.
236. Burk, supra note 15, at 34.
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framework should be applied, and it is sensible to analogize e-mail
communications with traditional forms of communication such as the
sending of letters, communicating over the telephone, or the transmit-
ting of facsimiles. 237 Thus, in cases involving claims of fraud, where
the fraudulent statements were made in e-mail messages, the defen-
dant should be considered to have purposefully availed itself of the
forum state.238 In other cases where the defendant and the plaintiff
exchange information by e-mail, the defendant knows where the
plaintiff resides, and the exchange leads to the execution of a contract,
the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the state where the
plaintiff resides when the plaintiff's claim arises from the e-mail
exchange. 239
D. General Jurisdiction
Courts have improperly applied the Zippo test to issues involving
general jurisdiction. Some decisions have mistakenly evaluated or
overemphasized a website's capacity for interactivity as a proxy in de-
termining general jurisdiction. The exercise of general jurisdiction re-
quires not just continuous and systematic activity but substantial
activity as well. Thus, the fact that a website is interactive should have
little relevance to the question of general jurisdiction.
1. The Supreme Court's Recognition of General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction, rather than specific jurisdiction, may be as-
serted when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are unre-
lated to the plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court in International
Shoe recognized the concept of general jurisdiction when it remarked
that a corporation's contacts with, and activities in, the forum state
can give rise to personal jurisdiction where the corporation's contacts
237. See, e.g., Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 n.11 (E.D. Va.
2002); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997); Edias Software Int'l v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996). In non-
Internet cases, courts have had little difficulty finding that the use of traditional forms of com-
munication between the plaintiff and the defendant may suffice to establish purposeful avail-
ment. See, e.g., Garner v. Sawgrass Mills, Ltd. P'ship, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1396, 1400 (D. Minn. 1994)
(finding purposeful availment when the defendant communicated with the plaintiff via tele-
phone, facsimile, and mail).
238. See, e.g., Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that defendant's
repeated telephone and e-mail communications with plaintiff regarding securities that defendant
had sold to plaintiff established purposeful availment).
239. See, e.g., Edwards v. Erdey, 770 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pls. 2001) (holding, in
a medical malpractice action, that the defendant surgical group, located in the Cayman Islands,
had purposefully availed itself of the forum state when defendant and plaintiff exchanged a
series of e-mails leading to plaintiff's decision to have defendant perform surgery on her).
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are continuous and substantial even when the claims against the cor-
poration are "entirely distinct from those activities. '2 40 Nearly forty
years later, the Court reaffirmed the existence of general jurisdic-
tion.241 General jurisdiction can only be asserted over a defendant
when the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state.2 42 Because the defendant can be sued in the forum state
for claims that are unconnected to its activities in the forum, 243 the
test for general jurisdiction must be much more stringent than the test
for specific jurisdiction.244 Federal courts, generally, "are reluctant to
assert general jurisdiction. 2 45 This judicial reluctance may be based
on two reasons. First, the ramifications in finding general jurisdiction
are great in that the defendant can be sued in the forum state for any
matter. Second, the contours of specific jurisdiction have so expanded
over the years that a state forum is practically assured for plaintiffs on
the basis of specific jurisdiction.246
240. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
241. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). In
Helicopteros, the Court said, "Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to
the foreign corporation's activities in the forum state, due process is not offended by a State's
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts be-
tween the State and the foreign corporation." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
779-80 (1984)).
242. The Helicopteros Court stated that the defendant's contacts with the forum should be
examined "to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general
business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins [v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.]."
Helicopertos, 466 U.S. at 415-16.
243. Id. at 415 n.9 ("When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant." (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786
(1984))); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 80-81; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 27, at 1136-44).
244. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted) ("The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is 'fairly high' . . . and
requires that the defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximates physical presence."); see
also ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) ("the threshold level of
minimum contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific
jurisdiction"); Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (E.D. Mo.
2001) ("Considering that the consequences of general jurisdiction are so significant-the party
may be hauled into the forum state to defend any cause of action-the bar to show minimum
contacts is set even higher than that required for specific jurisdiction.").
245. Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
246. See Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993). The court
observed:
[B]ecause specific jurisdiction has expanded tremendously, plaintiffs now may gener-
ally bring their claims in the forum in which they arose. As a result, obsolescing no-
tions of general jurisdiction, which functioned primarily to ensure that a forum was
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While the Supreme Court, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall,247 mentioned that the assertion of general jurisdiction
would be proper when the defendant's contacts with the forum state
are continuous and systematic, an additional requirement should be
made explicit-the defendant's contacts with the forum state should
be substantial.248 A substantiality requirement is consistent with the
Supreme Court's prior discussions of general jurisdiction. The Court
in International Shoe indicated that when a lawsuit was unrelated to
the defendant's contacts in the forum state, personal jurisdiction could
be asserted when the defendant had substantial contacts with the fo-
rum state.249 The Court reaffirmed the requirement of substantiality
in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.250
Making the requirement of substantiality explicit will help ensure
that a defendant could not be subject to general jurisdiction simply on
the basis of continuous and systematic conduct in the forum state that
was trivial.251 In assessing the appropriateness of general jurisdiction,
courts will often look to see whether the defendant has established
what amounts to a physical presence in the forum state, 252 which may
be shown by such activities as being headquartered in the forum state,
having a license to do business in the forum state, having a bank ac-
count in the forum state, owning property in the forum state, visiting
available for plaintiffs to bring their claims, have been rendered largely unnecessary.
Thus, broad constructions of general jurisdiction should be generally disfavored.
Id. (citations omitted).
247. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
248. Many courts have explicitly required that the contacts be substantial. See, e.g., Submersi-
ble Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring
"extensive" contacts); Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086; Asset Allocation and Mgmt. Co. v.
Western Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that Illinois law requires
for the assertion of general jurisdiction that the defendant's business in Illinois be "intentional,
substantial, and continuous"); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d
434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The nonresident's contacts must be continuous and substantial.").
249. The Court in International Shoe, describing the concept that years later would be called
general jurisdiction, stated that personal jurisdiction over a corporation can be asserted only
when the "continuous corporate operations within a state [are] thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against [the corporation] on causes of action entirely distinct from
those activities." Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
250. 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (stating that the exercise of general jurisdiction is warranted
when the "'continuous corporate operations within a state [are] thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities"' (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318)).
251. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999);
Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring that general jurisdiction can only be
asserted when the defendant's commercial activity in the forum is "continuous and substantial").
252. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086 (stating that a finding of general jurisdic-
tion "requires that defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence").
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the forum state, or having agents in the forum state.253 Thus, courts
have tended to reject the exercise of general jurisdiction when the de-
fendant has engaged in continuous and systematic conduct in the fo-
rum state, but such conduct was insubstantial.
2 54
2. General Jurisdiction and Internet Activities
General jurisdiction should not be exercised over defendants solely
because their websites can be accessed and viewed virtually any-
where.255 Thus, even though all websites can potentially be accessed
at any time and anywhere by anyone with Internet access, that in itself
should not be considered continuous, systematic, and substantial ac-
tiVity.256 It is in the Internet context where the requirement of sub-
stantiality ought to take on greater import in the general jurisdiction
analysis. A person can easily have his or her website accessible
throughout the world. If continuous and systematic activity were the
lone requirement, then that person would be subject to general juris-
diction anywhere. 257 A requirement of substantiality, therefore,
253. See, e.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002); Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83
F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
254. See, e.g., William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 268,
274-75 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding a strawberry seller's sales to forum residents amounting to
.05% of its total sales insufficient for general jurisdiction).
255. Most courts concur that general jurisdiction cannot be founded solely on the basis that
the defendant operates a website. See, e.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 715-16; Bird, 289 F.3d at 874;
Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086; Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d
1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999); Hy Cite, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62 (finding insufficient one sale to
forum resident via defendant's website); Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, S.A., 191 F. Supp.
2d 642, 647 n.10 (D.S.C. 2002); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel, Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d
824, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Molnycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods., Ltd., 64 F.
Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323,
330-31 (D.S.C. 1999) (no evidence that defendant ever conducted transactions with forum citi-
zens over the Internet); Desktop Tech., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. CIV. A.
98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999) (concluding that the defendant's web-
site could not enable general jurisdiction since consumers could not complete purchases through
the site); Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320.
256. See, e.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 715 (stating that "[e]ven though electronic transmissions
from maintenance of a website on the Internet may have resulted in numerous and repeated
electronic connections with persons in Maryland, such transmissions do not add up to the quality
of contacts necessary for a State to have jurisdiction over the person for all purposes").
257. For example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument that
because the defendant operated a website through which it generated sales every month in the
forum state, the defendant's contacts constituted continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state sufficient to subject the defendant to general jurisdiction. Hockerson-Halberstadt,
Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc., Nos. 012-1259, 02-1304, 02-1341, 2003 WL 1795641, at *13 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 1, 2003). The total sales in the forum state amounted to less than 0.0008 percent of the
defendant's total revenues. Id. at 13. The court emphasized that while the defendant's sales
through its website may have constituted continuous and systematic contact, the defendant's
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would require the court to assess the significance of that website activ-
ity that goes beyond mere accessibility.
In addressing general jurisdiction issues arising out of Internet ac-
tivity, courts should avoid relying on decisions resolving specific juris-
diction issues. While this may seem obvious, several decisions have
relied mistakenly on the Zippo sliding scale test of interactivity in ana-
lyzing general jurisdiction issues.258 However interactive the defen-
dant's website happens to be, interactivity alone cannot reasonably
serve as the basis for determining general jurisdiction.259 If an interac-
tive website constitutes purposeful availment of a forum simply by be-
ing accessible to Internet users, then contacts arising from the website
would be considered continuous, systematic, and substantial for pur-
poses of general jurisdiction.260 Therefore, under this misguided view,
a plaintiff could sue a nonresident defendant in any forum and claim
jurisdiction based on the defendant's interactive website, even if the
cause of action is unrelated to the website.261 Such a result would
hardly conform to notions of "fair play and substantial justice. ' 262
Personal jurisdiction was "never intended to reach so far and so
wide." 263
Typical of cases in which the sliding scale test was improvidently
applied to general jurisdiction is the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mink v. AAAA Development
LLC.264 The Fifth Circuit held that the Zippo test is appropriate in
determining general jurisdiction when the defendant has few or no
other contacts with the forum state.265 While the court correctly de-
cided that the defendant could not be subject to general jurisdiction in
the forum,266 the court's rationale, based as it was on the sliding scale
"contacts [in the forum state] were not so substantial and of such a nature as to justify the
exercise of general jurisdiction over it." Id.
258. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); MJC-A World of
Quality, Inc. v. Wishpets Co., Ltd., No. 00 C 6803, 2001 WL 987890 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2001);
Desktop Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 98572, at *3-5. For a discussion of the Zippo sliding scale, see
supra Part III.B.
259. See, e.g., Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1091 (E.D. Mo.
2001); ESAB Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (stating that "[gleneral in personam jurisdiction must
be based on more than a defendant's mere presence on the Internet even if it is an 'interactive'
presence").
260. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 923 (D. Or.
1999).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
265. Id. at 336.
266. Id.
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of interactivity, rests on a shaky foundation. The court emphasized
that the crucial factor was whether the defendant's website was pas-
sive or one in which the defendant "conducted business. '267 The
court concluded that, even though the website allowed users to print
an order form and posted various ways in which the defendant could
be contacted (a toll-free telephone number and mailing and e-mail
addresses), the website was passive. 268
While few cases have found that a defendant's operation of a web-
site was sufficient to justify general jurisdiction,2 69 one case in particu-
lar requires close examination for its misguided reliance on the Zippo
test. In Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,270 the United States
267. Id. at 337.
268. Id. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit did not cite an Eastern District of Texas case decided
in the previous year that held that the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction, partly based
on the interactivity of the defendant's website. See Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp.
782 (E.D. Tex. 1998). The Mieczkowski court found that the combination of defendant's sales in
Texas and the defendant's website supplied the necessary contacts to establish general jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 788. The website advertised the defendant's product line and prices and also pro-
vided an order form for customers to complete purchases and a feature that would allow
customers to check the status of their order. Id. at 787. In addition, customers could deal with
sales representatives via e-mail. Id. at 787. In much the same way that the Fifth Circuit would a
year later in Mink, the district court found applicable the Zippo sliding scale test in its analysis of
general jurisdiction.
269. See, e.g., Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating
that the defendant hotel's acceptance of room reservations through its Internet site is insufficient
for the assertion of general jurisdiction).
270. 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by, rehearing en banc granted by, 366 F.3d 789 (9th
Cir. 2004).
On February 15, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an 8-3 decision, dismissed as
moot the Gator.com v. L.L. Bean appeal. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125 (9th
Cir. Feb. 15, 2005) (en banc), vacating as moot 341 F.3d 1072 (2003). The court's decision was
prompted by the parties' settlement of the claims underlying Gator's action for declaratory re-
lief. The parties, in a jointly submitted letter, notified the appellate court of the settlement on
September 1, 2004. Id. at 1128. The settlement provided that after November 20, 2004, Gator
would "permanently discontinue" its pop-up advertisements on L.L. Bean's website. Id. In ad-
dition, Gator agreed to pay L.L. Bean a particular sum of money. Id.
However, the parties' letter to the court specifically indicated that the settlement did not in-
clude dismissal of the appeal regarding the personal jurisdiction issue. Id. In fact, the settlement
provided that if the appellate court were to affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over L.L. Bean, Gator would owe L.L. Bean $10,000. Id. The settlement fur-
ther provided that, if the appellate court did not affirm the district court decision, no payment
would be owed to either party. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1128. Upon being notified of the settle-
ment, the appellate court issued an order to show cause as to why the appeal should not be
dismissed as moot. Id. Gator and L.L. Bean submitted briefs arguing against dismissal. Id.
The majority ruled that because the settlement had "wholly eviscerated" Gator's declaratory
relief claim as to the legality of its pop-up advertisements, no live case or controversy remained.
Id. at 1131. The fact that $10,000 was riding on the appellate court's ultimate resolution of the
personal jurisdiction issue, the majority asserted, was only a "mere vestige of the parties' now
extinguished dispute" and thus amounted only to a "'side-bet' concerning our resolution of this
appeal." Id. at 1132.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that California courts
could exercise general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean solely on the basis
of the company's interactive website.2 71 Gator.com Corp. created and
sold software known as a "digital wallet," which makes it handy for
individuals to shop and make purchases on the Internet.272 The
software serves as a personal database, in which the software user can
store "passwords to various websites, user personal information, and
credit card information. '273 The software also monitors the websites
that the user visits, and when the user accesses certain websites, the
software "displays a pop-up window offering a coupon for a competi-
tor. Gator users who visit L.L. Bean's website are offered coupons for
one of L.L. Bean's competitors, Eddie Bauer, via a pop-up window
that at least partially obscures L.L. Bean's website. ' 274
In response, L.L. Bean's counsel sent Gator a letter demanding that
Gator stop its pop-up windows on L.L. Bean's website, asserting that
Gator's pop-up windows would mislead users into thinking that Gator
and Eddie Bauer were affiliated with L.L. Bean, and concluding that
L.L. Bean would be entitled to injunctive relief. Taking the judicial
initiative, Gator brought suit for declaratory relief against L.L. Bean
in the federal district court for the Northern District of California,
The dissent found that the settlement, by putting $10,000 at stake on the personal jurisdiction
issue, saved the appeal from being mooted. Id. at 1133-34. The dissent noted that, even after
the three-judge panel decision was vacated, L.L. Bean legitimately had much riding on the ap-
peal as the "panel decision is in the Federal Reporter for anyone to read." Gator.com, 341 F.3d
at 1142. Because the decision plainly indicates that L.L. Bean is subject to general jurisdiction in
California, "L.L. Bean has been anxious to preserve its right of appeal to the en banc panel, and
... it specifically structured its partial settlement with Gator in order to achieve that result." Id.
at 1143.
Coinciding with L.L. Bean's anxiety about a vacated decision that remains "on the books" is
the more global concern that the decision links general jurisdiction to the Zippo sliding scale of
interactivity. Thus, the three-judge panel decision, while vacated, is available for anyone to see
and ponder, including courts and present and future litigants. While the decision has been
divested of precedential authority, it would be natve to think that a litigant or judge would
overlook the decision in crafting a brief or an opinion. Heightening the potential influence of
the decision is the panel's unanimity. With no counterbalancing dissent, the decision may be-
come an exemplar of reasoning, perhaps invisibly guiding the analyses of future cases.
Whether the court correctly decided the mootness issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
What cannot be questioned is that a significant question regarding general jurisdiction remains
unresolved. The majority and dissent both agreed that the appeal raised significant issues involv-
ing personal jurisdiction. The majority concededly called these issues "important." Id. at 1132.
The dissent stated that "this appeal presents a question of 'continuing public importance"' in
that the law of the Ninth Circuit with respect to general jurisdiction was in disarray and that
resolution of the appeal would have helped "[a]ll potential litigants in this circuit." Id. at 1142.
271. Id.
272. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1075.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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seeking judgment that its software does not violate any trademark
rights of L.L. Bean and "'does not constitute unfair competition, a
deceptive or unfair trade or sales practice, false advertising, fraud or
any other violation of either federal or state law." 275 L.L. Bean re-
sponded by moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
district court granted the motion, ruling that it lacked both general
and specific jurisdiction. Gator appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 276
The court observed preliminarily that the "standard for establishing
general jurisdiction is 'fairly high."' 277 To meet this standard, accord-
ing to the court, "[t]he contacts with the forum state must be of a sort
that 'approximate physical presence.'-"278 Two types of contacts must
be considered. One type of contact requires a court to examine
whether the defendant has established a "presence' in the forum
state, including physical facilities, bank accounts, agents, registration,
or incorporation. '2 79 The other type of contact a court should con-
sider is the defendant's economic activity in the forum state. Relevant
here would be "whether the company has engaged in active solicita-
tion toward and participation in the state's markets.
280
Applying those standards, the court concluded that L.L. Bean
lacked the traditional indicia of physical presence, in that, for exam-
ple, L.L. Bean was not incorporated in California and did not have an
official agent in California. 281 The court then assessed L.L. Bean's
economic activity in California and found that its economic activity,
taken as a whole, constituted continuous and systematic contact with
California.28 2
In reaching its holding, the court broadly interpreted the continuous
and systematic contact requirement by wholly relying upon Gator's
allegations and summarily concluding that L.L. Bean "meets the first
set of factors set out in these cases: it makes sales, solicits business in
the state, and serves the state's markets. ' 283 The court further noted
that L.L. Bean targets California through its operation of a "highly
interactive website . . . from which very large numbers of California
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1076 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 228 F.3d at 1086).
278. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 228 F.3d at 1086).
279. Id. at 1077 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1078.
282. Id. ("[W]e find that there is general jurisdiction in light of L.L. Bean's extensive market-
ing and sales in California, its extensive contacts with California vendors, and the fact that, as
alleged by Gator, its website is clearly and deliberately structured as a sophisticated virtual store
in California.").
283. Id.
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consumers regularly make purchases and interact with L.L. Bean sales
representatives. "284
More far reaching was the court's assertion that L.L. Bean's busi-
ness activities on the Internet-alone-would suffice to subject it to
general jurisdiction. The court applied the Zippo sliding scale test.28 5
The court, cobbling together federal case law in other jurisdictions,
stated that general jurisdiction would obtain when the defendant con-
ducts business on the Internet and "the internet business contacts with
the forum state" are "substantial or continuous and systematic. '286
Noting that L.L. Bean generated "millions of dollars" worth of sales in
California, 287 the court found that L.L. Bean's contacts with California
satisfied the test for general jurisdiction, even though its total sales in
California generated from all types of transactions amounted to only
six percent of its overall sales.288
Given the court's conclusion that L.L. Bean's Internet activities
alone would subject it to general jurisdiction, 289 the decision is vulner-
able to attack because of its failure to indicate how much of L.L.
Bean's sales in California are derived through Internet transactions.
In lieu of that gaping omission, the decision conflates the interactivity
of L.L. Bean's website, through which it generated revenue, and L.L.
Bean's other marketing and sales practices, such as catalog transac-
tions, that it most certainly directed towards Californians. 290
284. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1078 (citation omitted).
285. Id. at 1079. The Ninth Circuit had adopted the Zippo test in a trademark dispute case.
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417-19 (9th Cir. 1997).
286. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1079 (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2002);
Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (E.D. Va.
1999)).
287. Id. at 1080.
288. Id. at 1074. After its evaluation of minimum contacts, the court concluded that jurisdic-
tion over L.L. Bean would be reasonable. Id. at 1080-81.
289. Note that the court's observation that L.L. Bean's Internet sales and activities alone
would suffice to subject the company to general jurisdiction is dictum.
290. Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1080. Even if a majority of L.L. Bean's sales in California were
through its website, at the very most, its sales would amount to no more than six percent of its
total sales. In other cases, such a small percentage of sales made in the forum state did not
amount to general jurisdiction. See, e.g., William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc.,
123 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that sales to forum state that amounted to less
than ten percent of total sales insufficient to support general jurisdiction); Stairmaster Sports/
Med. Prods, Inc v. Pacific Fitness Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Wash. 1995, affd, 78 F.3d 602
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that forum state's sales that amounted to three percent of total sales
insufficient to support general jurisdiction). However, if the total revenue continuously gener-
ated from the forum state were great, then general jurisdiction would most likely be appropriate.
Additionally, a finding that the forum state constituted the largest market for the defendant
should support general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Seltzer Sister Bottling Co. v. Source Perrier, S.A.,
No. C-90-1468 MHP, 1991 WL 279273 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 1991).
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The court's reliance on the Zippo sliding scale test is analytically
flawed, since the court applied the test to help resolve the question of
general jurisdiction. The sliding scale test should be used only to as-
sess whether the defendant's website constituted purposeful availment
when the issue involves specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.
Rather than determine whether the defendant had transacted business
with forum residents, the Gator court went down an analytical dead
end in applying the sliding scale test. The interactivity of the defen-
dant's website, viewed apart from forum-directed activity, should have
nothing to do with whether the defendant has engaged in continuous,
systematic, and substantial activities in the forum state. A website's
capacity for interactivity should have no weight in determining general
jurisdiction. 291
Applying the Zippo test to general jurisdiction issues is mistaken.
First, the issue in Zippo related not to general jurisdiction, which the
plaintiff conceded was lacking, but to specific jurisdiction. 292 Second,
establishing general jurisdiction simply because the defendant's web-
site is accessible in the forum state and interactive would essentially
establish universal jurisdiction. 293 The application of the sliding scale
test to general jurisdiction would unreasonably equate interactivity
with continuous and systematic activities in the forum state. It is as if
the potential of completing transactions online means the same thing
291. One district court, bound as it was by the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Mink, applied the Zippo
test and correctly decided that it could not exercise general jurisdiction, even though the defen-
dant's website was interactive. Planet Beach Franchising Corp. v. C3ubit, Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-
1859, 2002 WL 1870007 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2002). The court looked beyond the fact that the
website's interactive features potentially could lead to a great number of forum citizens subscrib-
ing to defendant's service and thereby generate large revenues. Instead, the court found that the
plaintiffs' assertion of general jurisdiction was an empty vessel, since they "made no showing of
the extent to which defendants' Internet activities penetrated Louisiana, whether measured by
subscriber data, hits on the website, or sales of products and advertisements." Id. at *6. Rather
than engage in a lengthy analysis of the website's interactivity, the court could have simply con-
cluded that it could not exercise general jurisdiction because no evidence pointed towards the
defendant transacting any business in the forum. See also LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Vitro, Sociedad
Anonima, 85 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862-63 (N.D. I11. 2000) (applying the Zippo test to general jurisdic-
tion issue and concluding defendant's website, because it did not allow for sales to be completed
online, was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction).
292. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1122.
293. Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1091. The Bell court stated that
[u]nlike most media, an internet website requires little expenditure of resources, it is
not directly targeted to any particular group of individuals or geographic area, persons
through their own impetus must seek out the site, and yet a website has the potential to
reach millions throughout the country and even the world. With seemingly inconse-
quential effort, and without any contacts directed toward any particular forum, the me-
dium could subject persons or companies who maintain websites to personal
jurisdiction in every forum.
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as operating a bricks-and-mortar storefront in the forum.294 This fal-
lacy is similar to the premise of universal jurisdiction in which the ac-
cessibility of a website, in and of itself, demonstrates purposeful
availment for purposes of specific jurisdiction.2 95 Universal jurisdic-
tion, in Internet jurisdiction cases involving specific jurisdiction, has
been roundly criticized. 296 Regardless of how interactive a website
happens to be, the level of interactivity cannot be the proxy in deter-
mining general jurisdiction. 297 The interactivity of a website is simply
an option available to users, a feature of the website that gives users
the choice of whether to interact or not.298 A user, in other words,
must take the first step to exchange information with the website op-
erator. 299 Cases dealing with general jurisdiction issues take the
wrong path when relying on the Zippo test in merely focusing on the
website's interactivity. 300
Rather, the general jurisdiction issue must turn on the evaluation of
all of the defendant's activities in the forum state. And the defen-
dant's activities in the forum state, for purposes of general jurisdic-
tion, must rise beyond the mere potential for marketing and sales that
an interactive website may provide. 301 Thus, a "more traditional gen-
294. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 337 (finding significant for general jurisdiction purposes that the
defendant's website did not allow for the completion of transactions online).
295. See supra Part III.C.
296. Inset and its progeny have been called "anomalies in the world of cyber-jurisdiction."
Yvonne Beshany & Sean Shirley, Cyber-Jurisdiction: When Does Use of the Internet Establish
Personal Jurisdiction?, 63 ALA. LAW. 36, 38 (2002); see also Christopher McWhinney et al., supra
note 127, at 1 ("Inset has suffered a great deal of criticism because it appears that Inset casts too
broad a net in the arena of personal jurisdiction. Further the ruling lacks serious minimum
contacts analysis characterized by other personal jurisdiction decisions. The case has received
minimal support.").
297. Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (asserting that "[t]he [general jurisdiction] analysis cannot
begin and end with the 'active' and 'passive' labels").
298. See, e.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that "unlike direct
marketing," those seeking to do business with the defendant via its website "must initiate the
contact" with the defendant).
299. Arriaga v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 380, 386 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
300. See, e.g., Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Burke/Triolo, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182-83 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (finding significant for general jurisdiction purposes that the defendant's website allows
users to request defendant's catalog, even though "no actual sales [were] transacted on line").
301. One court quickly dismissed the idea that it could exert general jurisdiction over the
defendant, because the defendant-whose contacts with the forum state consisted of the selling
of one music CD to one Oregon resident, the purchasing of a tiny fraction of its inventory from
an Oregon distributor, and the maintaining of its website-clearly lacked continuous and sys-
tematic contacts with Oregon. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp.
2d 907, 910 (D. Or. 1999); see also Bird, 289 F.3d at 874 (holding that just because customers
could complete domain name registrations via the defendant domain registrar's website could
not justify a finding of general jurisdiction); Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (stating that "[w]hile
the maintenance of a fully interactive website may, but does not necessarily, provide sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum to support specific jurisdiction for a cause of action that arises
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eral jurisdiction analysis" is warranted: An inquiry that taps into the
quantum of business that the defendant does in the forum state. 302
Moreover, whether a website targets the forum state should make
no difference in determining general jurisdiction. 30 3 A website that
targets residents of a particular state but fails to generate substantial
revenue from that state should not subject the website operator to
general jurisdiction. 30 4 By the same token, a website that does not
target the residents of a particular state but generates continuous and
substantial revenue from that state's residents should suffice to estab-
lish general jurisdiction over the operator.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Internet has opened new frontiers of information, com-
munication, and commerce, issues involving Internet jurisdiction must
be resolved in ways that are faithful to first principles of due process
as set forth by the Supreme Court. Jurisdictional issues involving In-
ternet activity, like issues involving more traditional activity, should
be resolved according to the defendant's overall contacts with the fo-
rum state and in relation to the substantive and factual underpinnings
of the lawsuit. The decision in Zippo, while a significant and desirable
change in the evolution of Internet jurisdiction, should not be applied
to all personal jurisdiction issues involving the Internet. The adoption
of a single test for Internet jurisdiction should be resisted given the
vast array of activities taking place through the Internet, the wide va-
out of or is related to the website, much more 'contact' with the forum is necessary to support
general jurisdiction where the cause of action is unrelated to the website"); Molnlycke Health
Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods., Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (ruling that
general jurisdiction could not be exercised on the sole basis that defendant operated an interac-
tive website through which it sold its products).
302. Arriaga, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 386. Nevertheless, the general principle for general jurisdic-
tion remains, even when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are only Internet-related:
A defendant that engages in continuous, systematic, and substantial business in a forum state
will be subject to general jurisdiction, even if those transactions take place solely through the
defendant's website. See, e.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (remarking that a brokerage firm's online business may constitute the basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction).
303. Some decisions have looked-mistakenly-to whether the defendant's website has
targeted the forum state as one factor in assessing the general jurisdiction question. See, e.g.,
Arriaga, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 386; Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (commenting that "[n]or have the
plaintiffs endeavored to show by inference that residents of Missouri are using the site by, for
example, showing that the site is targeted to users from Missouri"); see also Snyder v. Dolphin
Encounters, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
304. "The fact that a site is classified as 'interactive' is irrelevant to the analysis of general
jurisdiction if no one from the forum state has ever used the site." Bell, 200 F. Supp. 2d at
1091-92 (citing Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562
(E.D. Va. 1999)).
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riety of substantive claims arising from those activities, and the pre-
vailing principles of Supreme Court jurisprudence in which the test for
personal jurisdiction varies based on the specific claims being asserted
or whether general or specific jurisdiction is at issue.
